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For nearly a quarter of a century, scholars have been concerned explicitly with
the empirical relationship between democracy and physical integrity rights.1 The
literature has progressed a considerable amount from Stohl and Lopez (1984, 1986),
who aggregated a set of country and regional studies in an effort to gain some leverage
on the extent to which contextual variation effected a state’s use of force against its
citizens. In that time, a few factors have emerged as the prominent determinants
of state repression – namely, democracy, GDP and population. Aside from cursory
coverage, I leave the latter two of these as fodder for future academic endeavors and
focus on the former – democracy.
The literature on what Davenport (2007b) dubs the “domestic democratic peace,”
exists in a somewhat strange and seemingly unstable equilibrium. There is consider-
able and mounting evidence that democracy “causes,” state repression. In fact, this
democracy has been found to be one of the most important factors across space, time,
1Later in the manuscript, I go into great detail about how both democracy and repression have
been defined in the literature and how I define them specifically. However, by way of relatively quick
introduction to the topics under consideration, I refer to state repression as the state’s use of tactics
that unduly deprive citizens of their life (through extrajudicial killing) or their liberty (through the
use of torture, forced disappearances or political imprisonment). With respect to democracy, I mean,
in general, a complex of institutions that permits citizens to be involved in choosing their leaders
and that limits the power of the chief executive through a series of checks.
1
region and model specification. This robustness in empirical findings suggests a level
of theoretical rigor that has been lacking. The literature has generated three basic
hypotheses about how and why democracy should effect state repression.
1. Through the use of their power to elect and recall leaders, citizens are able
to increase the cost to leaders when they transgress the preferences of their
constituents.
2. Checks and balances (i.e., veto players) constrain the ability of leaders to make
harshly repressive policy.
3. Democracy provides opportunities for would-be dissidents to have their concerns
addressed in the political system.
Often, these have been offered together as three reasons why democracy could
matter and an empirical finding that democracy does influence repression is found
as corroboration for this set of hypotheses together. I argue throughout the course
of the ensuing manuscript that none of these three hypotheses have been sufficiently
“tested,” in empirical models. Some have made admirable strides in this direction
(e.g., Davenport 1996a, 1997, 2007b, Keith 2002), where either individual components
of democratic pacification or the whole complex of explanations are investigated.
Others, (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005) suggest that they have made strides
in this direction, but as I argue below, the empirical analysis does not get us much
closer to an understanding of how these various pieces of democratic pacification are
related. Finally, some have not even really tried to investigate these various influences
(e.g., Poe and Tate 1994). Thus, as a community of researchers, we are certain that
democracy influences repression, we simply have little in the way of evidence for
specific mechanisms. In the remaining pages of this manuscript, I directly test the
extent to which each of these hypotheses is supported by data, both individually and
in consort with the others.
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Not only has the literature been insufficiently precise in its hypothesis tests, it
has not taken measurement at all seriously. I take great pains to develop measures
that closely approximate the theoretical quantities of interest. Further, I use these
results of these measurement models in appropriate ways in further statistical analysis.
With other colleagues (Armstrong, Duch and Bakker 2007), I propose a way to re-
purpose standard statistical tools for dealing with multiply imputed data to the task
of estimating the parameters of predictive statistical models that include variables
that are themselves estimates with corresponding uncertainty. I apply those methods
to the data and measures developed here to provide the most rigorous investigation
of the democracy-repression nexus to date.
Finally, the theories that are generally offered are meant not only to show how
the dichotomous distinction between democracy and non-democracy works, but also
to show how different types of democracies behave differently. I argue that many of
the results that hope to provide evidence for these nuances have been mostly picking
up the difference between democracies and non-democracies. Further, theories that
suggest within-country relationships are often tested in models that leverage between-
country variation, thus not providing a test of the more micro-level theories at all.
By focusing primarily on a set of multiparty democracies, I take on both of these
criticisms and show that, in fact, we are not particularly good at predicting within-
country variation for two reasons - first there is often quite little variation on repression
within democracies; and second, the types of explanations we offer provide very little
within country variation. The only real exception to this is violent dissent, which has
considerable within-country variance, but as I will show, has relatively little within-
country explanatory power.
The findings are actually quite interesting and in some cases run almost directly
counter to the conventional wisdom about why and how democracy influences repres-
sion. Briefly, I find that electoral accountability is the best democratic predictor of
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repression. This confirms the findings of Davenport (2007b), but the reasoning runs
almost directly counter to his. Rather than citizens “voting the bastards out,” there
is considerable evidence that citizens may just as often be “voting the bastards in!”
I also find little evidence for the pacifying effect of veto players. This is, however,
more likely due to the fact that the literature has largely mis-interpreted Tsebelis
(2002) and that when appropriately assessed, there is actually very little variation to
leverage either for or against this hypothesis. Finally, I find that violent dissent has
an enormous impact on state repression and that violence, itself is negatively affected
by political inclusion. Further, I find that both electoral accountability and violence
have independent, and counter to the literature unconditional, effects on a state’s
repressive behavior.
The manuscript proceeds in six substantive chapters. In the first chapter, I outline
the progress of the research on the domestic democratic peace. The second chapter
provides a rigorous treatment of measurement for the variables of interest to the
investigation. Here, I also estimate models as that replicate past research with the
new measures to show that they behave in the expected fashion. In the subsequent
three chapters, I offer detailed analysis of the three hypotheses mentioned above -
starting with electoral accountability, then veto players and finally conflict. Next I
take the best results from each of the three chapters and combine them to assess the
support for each hypothesis in competition with the others. As I will show, variables
tend to fail on their own without help from collinearity, so the resulting final model
retains a number of interesting features of the models in each chapter.
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Chapter 2
The Domestic Democratic Peace
The theoretical underpinnings of the domestic democratic peace could be framed
as the tension between Hobbes (1997) and Madison (1787). On the one hand, the most
fundamental charge of any state is the protection of its citizens. By relinquishing some
power to the sovereign, citizens are able to secure a modicum of security and freedom.
When security is threatened, Hobbes would suggest that it is the State’s duty to step
in and secure its citizens at all costs. On the other hand, democratic governments
are generally operating within an institutional structure that was expressly designed
to prevent just this sort of governmental activism to ensure security at all costs. The
respect for minority rights is one of the hallmarks of modern liberal democracy. The
research on the domestic democratic peace, then asks – is democracy up to the task
of preventing governments from running roughshod over the rights of their citizens in
the face of security threats? And, if so, how?
The robust relationship between democracy and state repression has been termed
the “domestic democratic peace,” by Davenport (2007b). Here, Davenport is trans-
planting the language of the international Democratic Peace Theory to the domestic
realm. While this is not a thesis concerning the international democratic peace, it
is worth setting forth its major tenets in order to match them with their domestic
counterparts. The main finding of the democratic peace literature is that generally,
democracies do not fight wars with other democracies (Russett 1993). A secondary
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claim, and one that is perhaps more relevant here, is that democracies are more pacific
in general. The explanations for these findings range from structural to normative,
but empirical investigations have tended to focus on structures as they are much
more easily observed. There are a number of structural explanations, but they can
be grouped as follows according to Gelpi and Griesdorf (2001):
• Liberal leaders are subject to institutional constraints that make it impossible to
re-position state resources and efforts toward war mobilization without large-
scale public approval. Further, these constraints are common knowledge to
other states and as such, allow credible signals to be sent regarding willingness
to fight. Two states with similarly well-known constraints will be much more
likely to negotiate peaceful outcomes.
• Democratic government decreases the capacity of government leaders to extract
rents. As such, territorial expansion becomes less attractive.
• The fact that wars are public allow citizens to enforce “large and transparent
costs on leaders.” Thus, threats are taken seriously and the credibility of threats
between liberal states generally leads to a diplomatic solution.
These explanations all suggest that leaders are constrained by institutions and public
opinion.
The domestic democratic peace refers to a similarly robust empirical regularity -
democracies are less internally violent than non-democracies (Davenport 1996a, 1999,
2004, Fein 1995, Mitchell and McCormick 1988, Poe and Tate 1994, Poe, Tate and
Keith 1999, Regan and Henderson 2002). That is to say, violent state repression has
been found to be lower in democracies across a wide range of time-periods, contexts
and operationalizations (of both democracy and repression). In a very similar fashion,
explanations tend to be structural in nature and tend to focus both on institutions
and public opinion.
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There are, however, some important differences between the domestic and inter-
national democratic peace. Negotiation may be a less viable strategy in internal
conflicts. Repression has been found to be a response to violent dissent Davenport
(2007b). If the violent dissent is aimed at the destruction of the government either
from extremist forces within the polity or, more problematically from outside, then
it seems quite clear that the range within which an acceptable compromise could be
found is vanishingly small. Some degree of repression may be required to maintain
the security of the polity. It is often not discussed, but all repression is not equally
bad. There are more and less legitimate uses of repression and it is quite possible
that public opinion will be in favor of the legitimate use of repressive force. In fact,
as Davis (2007) and Davis and Silver (2004) suggest, citizens may even be in favor
of quite illegitimate forms of coercive force if the security environment is sufficiently
uncertain. Further, institutional constraints that are a function of the policy posi-
tion of other political actors (e.g., legislative leaders) could also be less relevant as
political leaders across ideological lines come together in favor of measures intended
to increase the security of the polity. Public opinion about an international war in
the face of violent action could be overwhelmingly in favor of action to security the
country’s territory.
Another major difference between the international and domestic democratic
peace is the obvious power asymmetry. Incomplete information in the international
realm can lead to unclear expectations about which side will win a conflict. This is
not technically the same internally except in extreme cases of state weakness. Gener-
ally, governments monopolize the state’s military capabilities. Thus, both sides know
who is stronger and what the ultimate outcome of a “war,” would be.
There are three broad theories that explain the mechanisms whereby democracy is
thought to reduce state repression. These are - veto (institutions), voice (electoral ac-
countability), and conflict resolution. It is this last that is the oldest in the empirical
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literature. Henderson (1991) suggested that democracies provide effective means for
the non-violent resolution of conflict and that in democracies, conflict should never
get sufficiently bad that repression is necessary. Poe and Tate (1994) used this as
their main argument for democracy’s pacifying effect. Despite being quite reasonable
theoretically, the empirical support for this proposition has been inconsistent. As
Lichbach (1987) suggests, aggregate studies are unable to model the strategic inter-
action between dissidents and governments and, as such, aggregate models are unable
to offer much in the way of consistent predictive power.
The second method through which democracies could influence repression is through
the checks they place on the chief executive. A considerable amount of theoretical
work has been done on the extent to which the number and position of veto players
makes policy change more or less likely (Tsebelis 2002, Keefer and Stasavage 2002).
If repression is viewed as a policy decision, then these results should apply equally
to this dimension as well. Unfortunately, it seems as though the literature has mis-
interpreted this finding and has found considerable support for its mis-interpretation.
Tsebelis suggests that analysis of this kind can only be conducted profitably within
each country independently. There is no necessary between-country relationship with
respect to the number of veto players. In general the literature has used statistical
techniques that leverage both between and within country variation in ways that
do not allow them to be separated (e.g., Armstrong and Davenport 2003, Bueno de
Mesquita et al. 2005, Davenport 2007b, Davenport and Armstrong 2004, Poe and
Tate 1994).
Thirdly, as Davenport (2007b) suggests, electoral accountability affects the state’s
willingness to use repression. The logic goes as follows – leaders want to maximize
the time they spend in office. As such, they need to be constantly seeking the favor of
their constituents. Citizens, always prefer less repression and thus leaders will always
be trying to minimize their use of repression to maximize their popularity. The basic
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premise that citizens prefer less repression is a dubious one at best (Davis 2007) as is
the implicit converse that regimes always prefer more repression (Olson 2000). While
this particular logic may have some flaws, the general idea is a sound one – leaders
should seek to maximize the extent to which they follow the preferences of their
constituents. Rather than their constituents holding them back, however, it could be
that constituents are pushing for more repression (i.e., increasing the demand). Either
way, electoral accountability should influence the state’s use of repression. Whether
the public opinion is stable and opposed to repression or variable (and occasionally
supporting of repressive action) is an empirical question that will be addressed below.
That is it. There are no complex formal models; there are no game trees. There
are simply three propositions that seem reasonable. Further, given the nature of
the analysis that has been done already, many would say that all three have been
confirmed. I however, disagree. It is rare to find scholars attempting to adjudicate
between these different explanations and those who have, reach differing conclusions.
For example, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005) find that many different aspects of
democracy must be in place before integrity rights are expected to improve. This
confirms the work of Davenport and Armstrong (2004) who found similar things,
though they did not attempt to address the question of which explanation was most
effective. Davenport (2007b) assess the extent to which voice and veto, in different
security environments affect a state’s use of repression. He finds that voice is relatively
more powerful than veto, though both work to decrease repression in various contexts
and both are less effective toward that end in the face of violent dissent.
The investigations that have taken place tend to consider not whether the specific
mechanism is or might be at work, rather investigations focus on conditions that
would allow that mechanism to function. For example, Davenport (2007b) considers
the extent to which voice (the ability of citizens to remove governments through
regular elections) is a feature of the political system. The assumption is that if the
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practice exists, citizens will use it as hypothesized. Whether citizens actually punish
leaders for increasing repression is an empirical question that is yet unanswered.
Further, research considering the extent to which more constrained executives adopt
less repressive strategies tends to focus only on the number of constraints. I will
consider the effect on observed human rights practices of differing positions that
political factions take on the issue. Through a deeper empirical investigation of these
theoretical ideas, I can begin to assess the claims made by each explanation.
2.1 A Brief History of the Domestic Democratic
Peace
Studies of state repression proceeded largely on country-by-country or regional
basis until the mid-1980’s (e.g., Dallin and Breslauer 1970, Duff and McCammant
1976, Fruhling and Woodbridge 1983, Gibson 1988). Lopez and Stohl (1989) and Stohl
and Lopez (1984, 1986) aggregated these works in an effort to give some coherence to
the subject as a global research agenda. As a discipline, the need to tie these studies
together with cross-national research was clear.
In 1994, Poe and Tate wrote what would become the seminal article in the field.
There, they hypothesized that either through democratic norms, democratic behavior
or democratic institutions, democracy makes states less likely to violate the physical
integrity rights of their citizens. Using both the Freedom House political rights mea-
sure (Piano and Puddington 2008) and Vanhanen’s polyarchy measure (Vanhanen
2000), they found that democracy was one of the most important factors in curbing
a state’s repressive tendencies. Most of the literature in the ensuing decade would
confirm this general finding.
Democracy has continued to receive virtual primacy in the explanations for state
repressive activity. In fact, as Davenport and Armstrong (2004) state, “Repeatedly,
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democratic political systems have been found to decrease political bans, censorship,
torture, disappearances, and mass killing, doing so in a linear fashion across diverse
measurements, methodologies, time-periods, countries and contexts.”1 This key find-
ing was probed and pushed in different directions. Davenport (1996b) and Zanger
(2000) considers the temporal pattern of respect for civil liberties (censorship and
sanctions). Still others, suggested a different functional form of the relationship such
as a second-degree polynomial (Fein 1995, Regan and Henderson 2002) or a threshold
(Davenport and Armstrong 2004).
Scholars have tended to focus on physical integrity rights to the exclusion of other
potentially interesting human rights. The reasons for this generally focus on en-
dogeneity, though there are substantive reasons to privilege these particular rights,
which I discuss briefly below. The overwhelming majority of work in this area has
used the Political Terror Scale (Gibney and Dalton 1996). This is a five-point scale
where increasing values refer to increasing severity and scope of the activities covered
- torture, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killing and forced disappearance. Re-
cently, Cingranelli and Richards (2004a) released a dataset that disaggregates these
various components.
There have been disagreements about dimensionality on both sides of the equa-
tion. McCormick and Mitchell (1997) suggest disaggregating the political terror scale
into two distinct dimensions, though in a more convincing paper, Cingranelli and
Richards (1999) show that the observed physical integrity rights indicators are well-
explained by a single dimension. The more interesting discussion of dimensionality
occurs on the democracy side. Both Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005) and Armstrong
and Davenport (2003) suggest disaggregating the Polity IV variable into individual
1There are few studies that say democracy does not matter, but one in this vein is Franklin
(1997) who shows that IMF conditionality matters for state repression, but that democracy (in the
form of Political Rights) does not have a significant effect on state repression.
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components, though they each take slightly different approaches to this. Neither ap-
proach was theoretical in nature (i.e., there was no attempt to test a disaggregate
theory of democratic pacification). Davenport (2007b), in the most rigorous and em-
pirically ambitious piece of work on the subject attempted to tease out the differential
effects of voice (electoral accountability of democratic leaders) and veto (institutional
constraints on policy choice) on repressive behavior. Here, all models were estimated
with only one democratic concept in them. The model statistics do not offer convinc-
ing advice on which model is best, so there is no real ability to consider the extent
to which different types of democracy are substitutes for each other, or whether they
are necessary conditions for each other.
The remainder of this work will be aimed at pushing Davenport’s (2007b) work
forward by estimating measurement models for voice, veto and repression and using a




Measurement is a fundamentally important step in the data analysis process. Mea-
surement is the process whereby numerical values are assigned to observations Stevens
(1946, 1959). These numerical values are the ones used to create correlations, cross-
tabulations and considerably more complicated estimates of the nature of statistical
relationships between variables of interest. The argument that the way numbers are
assigned to objects can effect inferences is not a very difficult one to make. I argue
that the lack of careful consideration of measurement has had a deleterious effect on
the domestic democratic peace research.
As suggested above, there are two concepts of particular interest in this literature
– democracy and repression. Of the two, much more attention has been focused on
the measurement of democracy. This is not surprising, given that democracy has
been and will continue to be a subject of intense scrutiny and intellectual curiosity
for the foreseeable future. While in this particular literature, democracy is seen as the
main explanatory variable, it also serves this role in many other sub-disciplines (e.g.,
the inter-state democratic peace, Oneal and Russett (1999)). Democracy also serves
as the dependent variable in a number of prominent studies,including Przeworski
(1991) and Przeworski et al. (2000). I will detail my measurement strategy for the
concepts of interest here below, but first, I offer a brief history of the measurement
of democracy and repression.
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3.1 Measuring Democracy
Since Plato, scholars have been debating the merits of various regime configu-
rations. It is not surprising that over the past two thousand years, the definition
of democracy and its various sub-forms has evolved. These new definitions do not
replace old ones, rather they sit alongside those definitions and conceptualizations
that have been either forgotten or found wanting on some level. Thus, scholars find
themselves facing a long series of “democracy with adjectives,” (Collier and Levit-
sky 1997). In the interest of parsimony and relevance to the endeavor here, I start
the investigation with the early attempts at measuring democracy, as all attempts
at measurement should have in mind an operational definition of the concept (obvi-
ously, the converse need not hold). Tracing the evolution of the measurements will
permit the simultaneous tracing of concepts and definitions. There are a number
of ways that this task could be accomplished. For instance, it would be possible to
look at the chronological development. I do this to some degree as I start with those
engaged in the developments at the mid-Twentieth Century, but will move forward
more thematically than chronologically.
I start with what Held (1996) calls “Competitive Elitism,” which was popularized
by Weber and Schumpeter. I start here as many of the early efforts at democratic
measurement relied on this work for their operational definition of democracy. Specif-
ically, Schumpeter (1962) argues:
the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by
means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.
This definition provides only that people are able to compete for votes. Obviously, this
definition has been criticized on a number of grounds. Schumpeter wanted to make
explicit the disconnect between democratic process and the aims to which democratic
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decision-making might be put, for example “social welfare,” or the “common good,”
(Held 1996). Weber (1978) suggested that democracy was, in essence, an elected
dictatorship. The requirements are similar to those of Schumpeter - elites vie for
votes in periodic, competitive elections. Weber saw the right of citizens to dismiss
ineffective leaders as the only real right of citizens and as the only piece of political
power worth surrendering to them. In the long run, this would lead to administrative
and political competence in the highest offices of the government.
There were a number of attempts aimed more or less at measuring this minimal
conception of democracy. Among these, the most notable might be Lipset (1959).
In general terms, democracy is defined here as free and fair, periodic, competitive
elections. This definition suggests certain conditions: “(a) a ‘political formula,’ a
system of beliefs, legitimizing the democratic system and specifying the institutions -
parties, a free press, and so forth - which are legitimized, i.e., accepted as proper by
all; (b) one set of political leaders in office; and (c) one or more sets of leaders, out
of office, who act as a legitimate opposition attempting to gain office,” (Lipset 1959,
p.72). Hearkening back not only to Weber and Schumpeter, but to Madison (1787),
Lipset sees democracy as requiring those in power consider and respect the rights of
those out of power. The exercise is to categorize countries in either “more,” or “less,”
democratic categories.
Cutright (1963), in a rebuttal to Lipset, developed a more sensitive measure of
democracy (he called it “Political Development,”) that depended largely on the char-
acteristics of the party system in the legislative and executive governing bodies. He
is less careful about the theoretical definition of democracy focusing more on the em-
pirical indicators. He suggests that “a politically developed nation has more complex
and specialized national political institutions than a less politically developed nation,”
(Cutright 1963, , p. 255), but this is the closest he gets to a theoretical definition.
Despite statements to the contrary by Lipset, Cutright observes high correlations be-
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tween political development and economic development measures. This is, perhaps,
the genesis of the debate between continuous and dichotomous (or more generally,
categorical) measures of democracy - something that still remains unresolved today.
There have also been more recent attempts at measurement of this minimalist con-
ception in various forms. Alvarez et al. (1996) propose a binary measure of democracy
as, “a regime in which some governmental offices are filled as a consequence of con-
tested elections.” Vreeland (2003) attempted to construct a continuous measure of
democracy that directly operationalized Schumpeter’s view of democracy. These mea-
sures all depend solely on indicators of competition or contestation and participation.
Dahl (1971) suggests that real democracy requires more than just periodic com-
petitive elections. He states, “a key characteristic of democracy is the continuing
responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as po-
litical equals.” The entire complement of First Amendment-type rights should be
available to a large number of people (e.g., freedoms of expression, association, press)
along with the right to vote, the right for leaders to compete for support and elections
that are free and fair. It seems as though Dahl is enumerating the factors required for
individuals to have a legitimate vote in competitive elections. A potential divergence
with previous scholars in this field is, perhaps, the responsiveness Dahl requires of the
government to the will of citizens as political equals. Vanhanen (2000) relies on Dahl
and Lipset (1959) for his continuous measure of democracy based on participation
and competition (contestation). Though the Freedom House organization does not
rely explicitly on Dahl’s operationalization of democracy, it is easy to see this con-
ceptualization in the indicators used to create its political rights indicator (Piano and
Puddington 2008), though this organization tends to define democracy more broadly.
An outgrowth of Dahl’s (1971) formulation of democracy is what a number of
authors refer to as “liberal democracy.” Liberal democracy, is a Madisonian concept
(Madison 1787) wherein government is designed to balance the rights of the few
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against the will of the many. Bollen (2009) defines liberal democracy as, “the extent
to which a political system allows political liberties and democratic rule.” These
systems are characterized by all of the attributes mentioned by Dahl, but explicitly
include the rule of law. There is some debate here whether suffrage/enfranchisement
(Bollen and Paxton 2000, Paxton 2000) or actual participation Moon et al. (2006)
is operative here. As Bollen (2009) suggests, it may be the case that participation,
while important to understand the effectiveness of democratic government on some
level, is different and distinct from liberal democracy. Liberal democracy has been the
subject of the most rigorous measurement to date, thanks to Bollen and colleagues
(e.g., Bollen 1980, 1990, 1993, Bollen and Grandjean 1981, Bollen and Paxton 2000)
A related literature has emerged recently considering how rational actors with veto
power can shape policy production (Tsebelis 1995, 2002). Systems with democratic
institutions may have actors that can constrain the set of decisions and policies over
which leaders may choose. This was in some ways operationalized well before the
literature came into its own with the executive constraints measure in the Polity
dataset Gurr (1974), Gurr, Jaggers and Moore (1990), Marshall and Jaggers (2001).
These data were based on earlier theoretical work by Eckstein and Gurr (1975). Here,
the authors cast the relevant political relationship as one between super-ordinates
and sub-ordinates. The result is the most commonly used dataset used to describe
the nature of democracy in regimes.1 Others have focused more narrowly on the
placement and power of these veto players. Henisz (2000, 2002) generates empirical
measures of the extent to which the policy space is constrained by veto players. Beck
et al. (2000) also develop a measure of checks and balances in the political system.
There is no doubt that many have presented various strategies for measuring
democracy, both as an overarching concept and as a series of quite specific indicators.
1Recently Treier and Jackman (2008) estimated a rigorous measurement model for the Polity IV
data, making them much more defensible.
17
Below, I draw on this literature to inform my measures of democracy as it pertains
to the democracy-repression nexus.
3.2 Measuring State Repression
Human rights violations and state repression are often used interchangeably. Rather
more likely is that state repression refers to violations of a subset of human rights.
The idea that individuals have a set of rights by nature of existence is not a new
idea. In published work, it dates back to philosophers like Locke (2004) who enumer-
ated several rights of individuals including “life, liberty and property.” These natural
rights were the basic principles on which the Constitution of the United States was
based. The ratification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations
1948) was the first widespread, politically relevant acknowledgement that individuals
everywhere are born with a set of rights of which they cannot be deprived legally.
These include “life, liberty and security of person,” (Article 3), “equality before the
law,” (Article 6) and a series of First Amendment-type rights - freedoms of movement
(Article 13), religion (Article 18) and association (Article 20). Also included are the
rights to participate in government (Article 21), a reasonable standard of living (Ar-
ticle 25) and the right to an education (Article 26). Few would disagree that this set
of rights represents a laudable goal. However, the rights here are so broadly defined
as to include what are generally considered social, economic and political outcomes,
rather than a set of rights. This makes human rights as defined by this document less
useful from an analytical point of view. In fact Goldstein (1986) warns against just
this sort of definitional complexity in quantitative studies of human rights.
The empirical study of human rights is not as deep or broad as the empirical
study of democracy. It has proceeded in a number of different directions. First, as
Landman (2004) notes, there is a distinction between rights in principle and rights in
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practice. Research on rights in principle focus on the extent to which countries are
legally committed to protecting human rights. This can be done either by considering
the extent of protections provided by constitutions (e.g., Foweraker and Landman
2000, Keith 2002, Maarseveen and Tang 1978) or by consider the extent to which
countries have ratified international human rights treaties (e.g., Davenport 1996a,
Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007, Hathaway 2002, Keith 1999, Landman 2005).
Scholars have also employed measures based on rights in practice. These methods
of measuring human rights are based on actual practices by the government regard-
less of the international or domestic legal arrangements that may exist. These are
themselves split into three categories - events based, standards based and survey
based. Events-based data try to chronicle each event that happened. These are often
done for a single country or a small set of countries (Ball 1996, Ball and Davenport
2002) or what Christian Davenport and Allan Stam have done with the GenoDy-
namics project (http://www.genodynamics.com). These efforts provide an incredibly
fine-grained look at human rights in a particular place over a relatively short period
of time. These data are difficult to collect, so they are generally not available for
a world-wide sample over a relatively long period of time. Survey-based methods
randomly sample some subset of the population to see either their perceptions or
experience of human rights violations.
Standards based measures are those that code qualitative information gleaned ei-
ther from newspapers or country reports into ordinal scales. These are the most widely
used in cross-national studies of human rights violations. Examples of these are the
Freedom House Freedom in the World Indicators (Piano and Puddington 2008), the
CIRI data (Cingranelli and Richards 2004b) and the Political Terror Scale (Carleton
and Stohl 1985, Gastil 1980, Gibney 2005, Gibney and Dalton 1996, Mitchell and Mc-
Cormick 1988, Poe and Tate 1994). The Freedom House measure casts its net quite
widely considering characteristics that might be labeled either democracy or human
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rights. The Political Rights measure is widely used as a measure of democracy and the
Civil Liberties measure is widely used as a measure of human rights compliance. The
CIRI data are meant to be a large-scale, publicly available extension of Cingranelli
and Richards (1999). This is the only one of the standards-based measures that takes
measurement seriously at all. Here, the authors assess the extent to which the data
they produce conforms to a cumulative scaling model. Finally, the PTS data (that
use information from both the US State Department and Amnesty International) are
measured by a five-point ordinal scale. Here, state repression is generally used to refer
to the violation of life integrity rights - including torture, killing, forced disappearance
and political imprisonment.
Repression and human rights violations have not seen the same amount of debate
about rigorous measurement as in the democracy literature. However, there have
been a number of studies that attempt to understand the measurement properties
and structure of data on human rights violations. Banks (1985) shows that a range of
indicators cluster into only a few categories. However, he takes a rather maximalist
conceptualization of human rights. Bollen (1986) considers a number of indicators of
state repression and suggests that these should form a relative low-dimensioned space,
though does not go so far as to estimate these models. McCormick and Mitchell
(1997) argue that personal integrity is a multi-dimensional concept, though they do
so without any explicit measurement model to test the hypothesis. Cingranelli and
Richards (1999), in a pre-cursor to their large-scale data collection project and in
response to McCormick and Mitchell (1997), showed that the political terror scale
items conformed to a unidimensional cumulative scale. I find the unidimensionality
persuasive. Given the desire for parsimonious explanations of political phenomena,
if one-dimension fits the data nearly as well as two (or more), that privileges the
explanation in a single dimension.
As a departure from the convention, Davenport (2007b) uses a state repression
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variable that combines elements of the Freedom House Civil Liberties indicator (Pi-
ano and Puddington 2008) with the Political Terror Scale (Gibney 2005, Gibney
and Dalton 1996). This creates a nine-point ordered scale with the ordering as fol-
lows (FH/PTS): Low/Low, Med/Low, High/Low, Low/Med, Med/Med, Med/High,
Low/High, Med/High. High/High. This is supposed to capture both non-violent and
violent state repressive behavior. While Davenport is to be lauded for combining var-
ious measures to obtain an operational variable more closely related to his underlying
theoretical definition, the properties of this variable from a measurement standpoint
where never investigated. He assumes ordinality in a case where it is relatively am-
biguous. For example, is the combination medium violence / low restrictions really
“worse,” from a human rights stand-point than high restrictions / low violence? It is
certainly a reasonable hypothesis, but there is nothing that would logically necessitate
that relationship.
As a very simple analysis of this proposition – that the variable created by Dav-
enport is ordered in the manner suggested, I simply found all permutations of the
numbers 1-9 which generated 362,880 possible combinations. I winnowed these down
to combinations that kept one as the first value and nine as the last value, leaving
around 5400 combinations. Then, for each combination I estimated an ordered logit
with the categories of the dependent variable ordered as suggested by the permutation
with a number of appropriate controls including a dummied-out version of the lagged
dependent variable. Of the 5400 models, 65 predicted more observations correctly
than the ordering suggested by Davenport. To be fair, the increase in predictive
power is marginal even for the best models, resulting in roughly 30 (or about 1%)
more observations correctly predicted. While this is not a considerably larger number,
it does suggest that other orderings could be at least equally good, if not better.
Another similar test allowed any reordering that kept values in either their original
place or either adjacent place. This generated 55 unique combinations. I performed
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a similar set of operations as above. Of these 55 orderings, only three produced more
correctly predicted observations than the original ordering and only by, at most, four
(about a tenth of one percent). This suggests that the orderings that do better than
this are significant re-orderings of the original categories. The best of the previous
set of models (with 30 more correctly predicted observations) had an ordering of: 1,
2, 5, 6, 8, 3, 4, 7, 9. Using the convention Freedom House low, medium, high / PTS
low, medium high (e.g., H/H represents high on freedom house and high on PTS), the
new ordering is: L/L, M/L, M/M, H/M, M/H, H/L, L/M, L/H and H/H. There does
not seem to be an obvious pattern here, but this is at least suggestive that something
else might be going on than originally thought.
3.3 Operationalizing Voice, Veto and State Re-
pression
As suggested above, the democracy-repression nexus proposes a quite specific
relationship between democracy and repression. This effectively limits the scope
of democracy. While a number of the projects discussed above propose measures
of democracy that are intellectually interesting, none, on its own, provides exactly
what is needed. Rather than implying a deficiency with any particular measure,
though, I am simply suggesting that it is possible to get “better,” estimates using
more data. That is to say, for example, using different measures of veto players can
lead to a better measure of the underlying concept of constrained executives than
any individual measure. I employ a Bayesian measurement model to aggregate the
data in a rigorous fashion, which will permit the calculation not only of all model
parameters, but also the standard errors of model parameters including the latent
variable scores (Congdon 2003, Lee 2007, Treier and Jackman 2008). Below, I discuss
the operationalization and measurement of voice, veto and repression.
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3.3.1 Voice
Davenport (2007b) uses two indicators of voice. The first is the measure of suffrage
developed by Bollen and Paxton (2000). This simply records the proportion of the
adult population with the right to vote. He also uses the modification to the Vanhanen
(2000) polyarchy measure discussed by Gates et al. (2006), which I also use below.
Rather than combining these two measures, Davenport estimates different models.
Any difference in the results will presumably not be owing to a difference in the
country’s true voice, rather it will be due to a difference in the measurement strategies
for these particular variables and measurement error. The measure I present below
mitigates the effect of measurement error.
I use five indicators to operationalize voice. The first two come from the Polity
IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2001) - competitiveness of executive recruitment
(xrcomp) and the competitiveness of political participation (parcomp). Competitive-
ness of executive recruitment is a three-point ordinal scale that ranges from hereditary
or similar selection (1) to election (3). Competitiveness of political participation is a
five-point scale, ranging from repressed competition (1) to competitive (5). I also use
the democracy measure offered by Alvarez et al. (1996), which is a binary measure
coded 1 if legislative and executive offices are filled via election, there is more than one
party and there has been at least some history of the alternation of power among par-
ties. Also included is the dichotomous measure developed by Bernhard, Nordstrom
and Reenock (2001) which involved an original coding effort to operationalize the
definition of polyarchy set out by Dahl (1971). Finally, I use the data developed by
Vanhanen (2000) and modified by Gates et al. (2006). This measures is multiplicative
in competition (the percentage of legislative seats held by all but the largest party)
and participation (the percentage of adults who voted). However, countries with
competition scores less than 30 automatically score zero on the composite indicator.
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This indicator is continuous.2
It is not especially difficult to see how each of these variables operationalizes,
at least a part of, the underlying idea of voice. They all focus to some extent on
competition and participation - the two necessary conditions for citizens to have a
voice.
3.3.2 Veto
The theoretical idea behind the “veto,” argument is, again, relatively straightfor-
ward. Tsebelis (2002), suggest that there are a number of political actors with the
ability to veto legislation (either beforehand in the case of the legislature) or after
the fact (in the case of an independent judiciary). The preferences of these relevant
actors and the rules governing the votes necessary for legislation to pass are sufficient
to partition the policy space into a set of policies preferable to the status quo and the
set of policies not preferred to the status quo. It is only policies in the former set that
would pass. Applying this to the democracy-repression nexus, Davenport (2007b)
suggests that changes in repressive policy would have to be preferred to the status
2The original Vanhanen indicator was simply multiplicative in competition and participation. I
use a version (G) that is multiplicative in the proportions as follows, where c is the proportion of
seats won by all but the largest party and p is the proportion of adults voting in the population:
G = c× I30(c)× p (3.1)
Here, I30(c) is an indicator function that takes value one if c > 0.3 and zero otherwise. Since the
resulting measure is a product of proportions, it will also have the range [0,1], though the observed
upper range will generally be much less than one. I use the logit transform to put the variable G







It is the lG measure I use in the measurement model.
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quo by a number of relevant actors. Thus, chief executives would be generally unable
to make unilateral changes in repressive policy. Further, any changes that are made
would necessarily be relatively small, therefore it would be difficult for democracies
to choose harshly repressive strategies.
There are a number of datasets that contain some measure of veto players. I
will look at three specific datasets here. First, is Polity IV’s executive constraints
(XCONST) measure (Eckstein and Gurr 1975, Gurr, Jaggers and Moore 1990, Mar-
shall and Jaggers 2001). This measure does not explicitly measure veto players,
it measures constraints on executive authority. Specifically, executive constraints,
“refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making power of
the chief executives, whether individual or collective.” Marshall and Jaggers go on to
say, “[t]the concern is therefore with the checks and balances between various parts
of the decision-making process,” (Marshall and Jaggers 2001, 23). The scale ranges
from one to seven; brief definitions for each category are listed in Table 3.1. There is
a considerable amount of ambiguity here, in that there are nearly as many ambigu-
ously defined “intermediate categories,” as there are substantively defined categories.
The executive constraints variable strays a bit from the more traditional veto-players
variables as it is possible that there are powerful groups in one-party states that count
as constraints that may not count as veto players, per se.
Another measure of veto players is that included in the Database of Political
Institutions (DPI) (Keefer 2002). This measure increases with constraints on the
executive. Specifically, one point is added for a chief executive, another point is
added if that chief executive is competitively elected. Another point is added if the
opposition controls the legislature. Further, checks are added for legislative diversity,
generally if the chief executive is not thought to be in full and complete control of his
party and his party is a single-party governor. The range of the checks variable is one
to 18, with the bulk of the data in single-digits. The mean is 2.5 and the median is 2.
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7 Executive Parity or Subordination (to legislature)
As Keefer and Stasavage (2002) suggests, the checks measure in the DPI was designed
to capture both what Tsebelis (2002) called “partisan,” and “constitutional,” veto
players. For the countries with multiparty elections, the mean is 4.6 and the median
is 4. The range, however, remains about the same, one to 16.
Another set of measures of checks and balances include those developed by Henisz
(2009). The first is political constraints III (POLCONIII). This variable, “estimates
the feasibility of policy change (the extent to which a change in the preferences of
any one actor may lead to a change in government policy),” (Henisz 2002, 363). The
feasibility of policy change is measured by the alignment of branches of government
with veto power. The feasibility of policy change is greater in countries where the in-
terests and preferences of the legislative house(s) and the chief executive are aligned.
The author suggests that these capture a similar underlying process to those of Tse-
belis (1995) and presumably to Tsebelis (2002). The logic of political constraints V
(POLCONV) is similar to the of POLCONIII, but includes two other veto players -
an independent judiciary and sub-federal units, as suggested in Henisz (2000).
The models here require that the variables be conditionally independent from
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each other. This means that once the latent variable is accounted for, the remaining
measurement error is assumed to be i.i.d. A necessary, though not sufficient, condition
for this to be true is that the variables are not related by construction. Thus, I
only use a subset of the variables mentioned above. Specifically, I use the polconiii
variable from Henisz (2002) rather than polconv because the latter uses the Polity IV
executive constraints measure in its construction (as a proxy for judicial independence,
actually). I also use the other variables, unrelated to Polity IV, that operationalize
additional veto points that were included in polconv - namely the Law and Order
variable from the The PRS Group (2009) and the sub-federal veto players identified in
the newest version of the POLCON database. I also use Polity IV’s xconst variable
as well as the log of the checks measure from Keefer (2002).
With the possible exception of Polity’s executive constraints variable, all of these
explicitly try to measure the feasibility of policy change as envisioned by Tsebelis
(2002). These provide relatively similar information. The smallest correlations are
between the checks variable and the two POLCON variables at around 0.63 each.
The highest correlations are among the two POLCON variables at around 0.92. The
Polity IV executive constraints measure is correlated at around 0.7 with the other
variables.
3.3.3 Repression
The literature has been basically unanimous in its use of physical integrity rights
as the dependent variable in models of the democracy-repression nexus. As Carleton
and Stohl (1985) note - these rights were explicitly singled out as important by the
US Congress in the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975 and
the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. The
argument here is that repression cannot cause a set of institutional arrangements.
I also use physical integrity rights by using the data developed by Cingranelli and
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Richards (2004a). These data are a publicly available extension of the earlier work
done by Cingranelli and Richards (1999). Here, the authors found that the four
aspects of physical integrity rights were well-described by a unidimensional cumulative
scale. I use a parametric version of that model here.
Each aspect of physical integrity rights - torture, political imprisonment, forced
disappearances and extrajudicial killing, is measured by one variable. Each of the
four variables ranges on a three point scale: no incidents (0), 1-49 incidents (1), ≥ 50
incidents (2). These directly operationalize the four aspects commonly mentioned in
the literature and measured by the more commonly used Political Terror Scale (PTS)
(Gibney and Dalton 1996).3
3.4 Models and Results
The empirical modeling proceeds in two parts. First, I estimate the measurement
models with variables described above. Then, I use these in a predictive model to
re-estimate the model suggested by Davenport and Armstrong (2004).4
3.4.1 Measurement Models
Each measurement model will take roughly the same form, so I develop the model
in its most general form here and apply it to each set of indicators mentioned above.
3Since the model assumes conditional independence of the indicators given the latent variable, I
choose not to use the PTS codings of Amnesty International and State Department country reports.
The reason is because the CIRI variables use the same source material so conditional independence
is unlikely. While the aims of the two indicators are not perfectly overlapping (the PTS also codes
some violence by non-state actors), they are sufficiently close to warrant not using the PTS variables.
4While this model is not the most recent one, it is the most recent one focusing on this core idea
using the dependent variable of interest. Further, these authors present an interesting modification
to the traditional understanding of the effect of democracy.
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Here, let Y refer to the N × k matrix of observed variables (think of this as the four
repression variables if you like). The underlying measurement model, then suggests:
Y = f(latent) (3.3)
Thus, the idea is not especially difficult to grasp. However, the particulars get a
bit more complicated. First, the nature of f(·) changes with the observed variables.
Continuous variables will be a linear function of the latent variable, binary variables
will be a logistic function of the latent variable and ordinal variables will be an ordered
logistic function of the latent variable.5 All three types of data exist in the models
mentioned here. Further there are two different measurement models - one where the
voice and veto indicators are separately predicted by their own latent variables and
one where both sets of indicators are predicted by a single democracy latent variable.
The latent variables all have the same structure. In the first period (i.e., the
first year the independent state appears in the dataset), the country’s latent vari-
able score (θijt)is drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and precision
τj1, where i indexes country, t indexes time and j refers to the latent variables;
j = {veto, voice, democracy, repression}. In the subsequent periods, autoregressive
5For continuous indicators,
Y continuousi = λ0 + λ1Latenti + ei (3.4)
for binary indicators,
Pr(Y binaryi = 1) =
1
1 + exp(−(λ0 + λ1Latenti))
(3.5)
and for ordinal indicators,
Pr(Y ordinali = m) =
1
1 + exp(−(κm − λ1Latenti))
− 1
1 + exp(−(κm−1 − λ1Latenti))
(3.6)
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priors are used such that the country’s latent variable score is drawn from a nor-
mal distribution with mean µijt = ρjθijt−1 and precision τj2. The precisions are all
given Gamma(1,1) priors and the various autoregressive parameters are given uniform
priors over the range [-1,1].
In the measurement model, the coefficients relating the latent variable to the
observed variables (i.e., the λ’s) are given normal priors with mean zero and unit
variance and are constrained to be positive, to prevent an equally good mirror image
solution. To set the scale of the latent variable, the coefficient on the first variable
is set to 1 and its corresponding intercept is set to zero. It will be obvious from
the results which coefficients are fixed for identification purposes. In the ordered logit
models, the threshold parameters (κ’s) are drawn from truncated normal distributions
in such a way as to preserve the appropriate ordering. For example, for a variable
with four ordered categories, κ0 is set to −∞ and κ4 is set to ∞. κ1 is drawn from a
distribution that has an upper bound of κ2. κ2 is drawn from a distribution that has
a lower bound of κ1 and an upper bound of κ3 and so on. In the repression model,
the first set of cutpoints also has to be set and they are set in such a way that when
the latent variable is zero, the marginal distribution of the first indicator is produced.
Democracy and Dimensionality
To address the dimensionality of democracy, I estimate two different measurement
models. One where the voice and veto indicators are predicted by their own latent
variables (of voice and veto, respectively). I also estimate a measurement model that
treats both the voice and veto indicators as measures of a single democratic variable.
This is essentially a test of dimensionality of the democratic concept. The details of
the measurement models remain the same, so I do not discuss them in detail again.
The parameter estimates should be sufficient to permit the evaluation of the models
and I discuss the results with respect to the different dimensionality below.
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At this point, it is worth making a small digression about dimensionality. Despite
a firm grounding in measurement theory (e.g., the collected works of Bollen and
colleagues cited throughout), it seems there is considerable resistance to this approach.
The resistance comes from the laudable goal of estimating the effect of specific aspects
of democracy (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005, Keech N.d.).6 These two ideas are
seen as inextricably linked by the proponents of “causal specificity.” For this group
of individuals the benefits of adopting this strategy outweigh the costs – modeling
measurement error as potentially interesting. The argument that assessing causal
mechanisms can be done only, or at least most profitably, by modeling the response
as a function of individual variables suffers from two flaws that are not often discussed.
First, the idea that single variables are better than the products of measurement
models assumes that the concept of interest is perfectly measurable with a single
variable. Further, it assumes that the variable employed in the model is this per-
fectly measured realization of the phenomenon of interest. I think this assumption is
generally untenable. Proponents of the causal specificity point of view, perhaps do
not understand the causal mechanisms could be tested with measurement models es-
timated on quite specific domains (like voice and veto in the specifications suggested
below). If voice really is a complex of issues related to the ability of individuals to
periodically choose their leaders, then, there are a number of variables that might
be related to those concepts. Not using a measurement model would require the
inclusion of all of these to “test the mechanism.”
This brings me to the second main flaw. This need not necessarily be a flaw, but
generally arises in practice. This is the fact that these various measures of the same
underlying concept are very closely related. Let’s suppose, for the sake of argument
that three variables x1, x2 and x3 are all measures of the underlying concept ξ and
that they are relatively highly correlated, as measures of the same concept often are.
6I have even found myself (Armstrong and Davenport 2003) on this side of the debate.
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You might think of these as the measures of voice and veto from above. When es-
timating y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3 + γZ, where Z is a set of other controls, the
eye is drawn to the marginal effect of each of the x variables and often inferences
are made about what happens when x1, for instance, is moved holding the other
variables, including the other x variables, constant. The problem is that x1 probably
only varies over a relatively small range when x2 and x3 are held constant at some
value. To put this in context, consider competitiveness of participation (PARCOMP),
executive constraints (XCONST) and competitiveness of executive recruitment (XR-
COMP) from the Polity IV data. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005) would suggest
that to understand how these variables influence repression, we simply look at the
marginal effects in the model. Would we expect the effect of slightly more competi-
tion in executive recruitment to matter when there are no executive constraints and
no competition of participation? Perhaps not. The interrelations of these variables
suggest that multiplicative effects might be more appropriate than additive effects.
Once this is done, the simple picture envisioned by the causal specificity folks is a
distant memory. Further, when considering data density, the conditional predictions
become even more difficult to calculate and interpret because valid inferences are only
made over relatively narrow ranges of the conditioning variables.
All of this is not to say that we should not be considering causal mechanisms and
the effect of specific concepts on our response variables, rather it is to say that there
is a better way. Using measurement models does not preclude consideration of the
original indicators, quite the contrary. Consider the veto latent variable for example
and its indicators checks, sub-federal veto and executive constraints. These variables
are related to the latent variable in the following ways:
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log(checks) = λ01 + λ11Veto + ε1 (3.7)




1− Pr(Sub-Fed = 1)
)
= λ03 + λ13Veto (3.9)
This means that for any given value of V eto, it is possible to get the most likely value
(i.e., the predicted value) of either checks, executive constraints or the probability of
sub-federal veto existing. For example, a change in the veto latent variable from 1 to
2 would generate the following expected changes in the indicators:
checks :eλ01+λ11×2 − eλ01+λ11
xconst :λ12





I demonstrate this below on the predictive models.
3.4.2 Measurement Model Results
The results of the measurement model are presented in Table 3.2. In all of these
models, the coefficients are significantly different from zero, suggesting that the latent
variable is at least a moderately good predictor of the observed variables. At first
glance, the coefficients, especially for the democracy model versus voice and veto look
quite different. However, this is reasonable because the variance of these variables
is quite different. You can see, the coefficients on the veto variable are bigger than
they are on the democracy variable by a factor of about 6, which is roughly the ratio
of the variances of the democracy latent variable to the veto latent variable, so this
seems quite reasonable. The posterior means of voice and veto correlate at roughly
0.9, so there is definitely a strong relationship there. However, they are not perfectly
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related. The posterior means of the democracy latent variable is correlated with voice
at 0.98 and veto at 0.94, so there is clearly some strong inter-dependence here.
Despite the quite high inter-correlations here, the DIC for the overall structural
models is unambiguous. DIC, in a similar fashion to AIC, is an information theoretic
measure that penalizes model fit for model complexity. As Spiegelhalter et al. (2002,
584) suggest of more conventional penalized fit measures, “... in complex hierarchi-
cal models parameters may outnumber observations and these methods [referring to
AIC and BIC] clearly cannot be directly applied.” The DIC clearly favors the less
parsimonious model here, suggesting that the added complexity of estimating an-
other latent variable is compensated by increased model fit. This suggests that the
two-dimensional conceptualization of democracy is superior to the unidimensional
conception of democracy.
3.4.3 The Predictive Models
As suggested above, I use the measurement model results (i.e., the posterior esti-
mates of the latent variable scores for each country-year) to estimate predictive models
for repression based both on voice and veto and on the overall democracy measure.
While I spend the remainder of the manuscript moving beyond these particular model
specifications, I find this useful to provide a benchmark for these results. As you will
see below, the variables employed here behave as expected given previous empirical
work. Toward this end, I estimate two empirical models. The first keeps voice and
veto as distinct concepts:
Integrity Rights = β0 + β1Integrity Rightst−1 + β2Voice + β3Veto (3.10)
+ β4voice× veto + γX + e
where X refers to a set of control variables that will be discussed in greater detail
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below. I also estimate another model that treats both voice and veto indicators as
being caused by the same underlying latent factor, called democracy:
Integrity Rights = β∗0 + β
∗






Both model specifications are meant to operationalize the idea discussed in Davenport
and Armstrong (2004). This is the idea that increases in democracy will only effect
changes in repression when there is already a modicum of institutionalized democracy
in place. That is to say as a full autocracy becoming slightly less autocratic (e.g.,
through sham elections or token political opposition) this should do very little to
change a state’s repressiveness.
The control variables used here in X are GDP/capita and the natural log of pop-
ulation, both coming from Gleditsch (2002). Also included are dichotomous measures
of interstate and civil war from Gleditsch et al. (2002).
Now, I investigate how these two different measurement models interact with
the predictive statistical models mentioned in equations 3.10 and 3.11. Table 3.3
presents the coefficients from the predictive part of the model. All of the variables
are significant here, save interstate war which is equally insignificant in both models.
The coefficient for voice is not statistically significant, but due to the interaction, this
is only the coefficient for voice when veto is equal to zero. As I show below, there
is a big range of veto for which the conditional coefficients for voice are statistically
significant. The results here are consistent with previous results in the literature (e.g.,
Davenport and Armstrong 2004, Poe and Tate 1994).
I started the investigation by suggesting that the models here would bring new
insight into how interdependent pieces of democracy work together to lower a coun-
try’s expected level of integrity rights violations. As has been well established, with
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interaction terms, especially interactions between continuous variables, the condi-
tional coefficients should be plotted rather than trying to interpret the coefficients in
the model directly (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006, Braumoeller 2004, Kam and
Franzese 2007). Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 3.1 show the conditional coefficients
and 95% credible intervals for voice and veto, respectively. As you can see here, the
conditional effects of both variables are only significantly different from zero when the
other takes on higher values. This provides a more nuanced picture of what Daven-
port and Armstrong (2004) suggest. Namely, that a number of aspects of democracy
must be in place before further democratization has any significant marginal effect.
It is possible, using the parameters of the measurement model, to recover the
values of the observed variables that correspond to the point where at which the
marginal effect becomes significant. For voice, in panel (a), the critical value of veto
is around 0.16. For values of veto bigger than 0.16, the effect of voice is negative and
statistically significant. A value of 0.16 on veto, corresponds to values on the observed
veto indicators approximately equal to the values listed in column 1 of Table 3.4, in the
rows labeled “voice.” That is to say, when veto equals 0.16, we would expect checks to
be around 1 (the lowest value on this variable, but one occupied by about 45% of the
observations). Political constraints (polconiii) would be around 0.123, or roughly
at its 45th percentile.7 This can be interpreted to mean that the effect of voice is
not significant until political constraints are greater than those in roughly 45% of the
country-years in the dataset. When veto = 0.16, the model would predict executive
constraints at 3, meaning, “slight to moderate limitation on executive authority,”
(Marshall and Jaggers 2001, 23).8 A value of 0.16 on veto corresponds to a value of 3
7Examples of countries with values around 0.123 on the political constraints variable are Brazil
throughout the 1990’s, Poland (1991-1993) and Botswana in the early 1980’s and early 1990’s.
8Examples of countries with executive constraints equal to 3 are China throughout the 1980’s,
Kenya throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, and South Korea in the early 1980’s.
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on the law and order variable. This would be a country with either nonzero, but still
incomplete, impartiality of the legal system or nonzero, but still incomplete, popular
respect for the law.9
The other half of column 1 (Table 3.4) refers to the predicted value of the voice
indicators for the mean value of voice (roughly - 2.5) when veto is at least 0.16.10 The
values in the “voice,” portion of column 1 are the predicted values of the voice indi-
cators when the voice latent variable is - 2.5. The top three indicators are essentially
probabilities whose range is [0,1]. The range of competitiveness of executive recruit-
ment is [1,4] and for competitiveness of participation it is [1,5]. This suggests that
movement from Gates values of [0,0.074] should not result in significant changes in
repression. The others can be read in a similar fashion. Countries whose human rights
could be expected to benefit immediately from even small amounts of democratiza-
tion on the voice dimension are those with veto values bigger than 0.16 and with voice
values bigger than -2.5. The countries that fit this bill (with −2.5 < voice < −2), are
Kenya (1993-1995), South Africa (1982-1986) and Zimbabwe (1987-1988).
The second column of Table 3.4 can be read the same way, though the interpre-
tation is flipped. Here, those values in the “voice,” section of column 2 refer to the
values of the voice indicators above which a change in veto will be statistically signifi-
cant. The values of veto in column 2 represent the values of the veto indicators at the
expected value of veto at the critical value of voice (i.e., the value of voice at which
the veto conditional coefficients turn negative and significant). There are similarly
a number of countries poised at the edge of productive democratization on the veto
9Examples of countries in this situation with respect to law and order are Argentina in the late
1980’s and early 1990’s, Mexico in the late 1980’s through the late 1990’s and Turkey in the mid-late
1980’s.
10To find this, I simply ran an OLS regression of the posterior means of voice on the posterior
means of veto and generated the prediction of voice when veto = 0.16. The relationship between
the two variables is sufficiently linear to make this a reasonable strategy.
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dimension. These are countries whose values on voice are sufficiently high that the
veto coefficient is significant and negative and have values on veto that are at the
expected value for the critical value of voice (- 1.38). A few examples are Albania
in the early 1990’s, Georgia (1991-1999) and Honduras through the late 1980’s and
early 1990’s.
Panel (c) of Figure 3.1 shows the interactive surface (β2Voice+β3Veto+β4Voice×
Veto). The lightest color represents the entire surface. The next darkest shade rep-
resents the areas where 1) the predicted surface is significantly different from zero
and 2) the density evaluated at the center corner of the lower-right grid cell is in the
highest 75% of all of the densities at the lower-left corners of all the grid cells. The
darkest region is similar to the above, except only the highest 50% of the densities are
used. The biggest effects can be seen when both veto and voice take on high values.
There is no significant effect when either veto or voice takes on low values. This is
completely reasonable given that there are very few data points in the asymmetric
extremes (i.e., high voice-low veto or high veto-low voice).
It is also possible to find the countries here that are poised to start to feel the effects
of democratic pacification. These are countries whose voice and veto values are both
less than their respective 65th percentile values, but whose values are sufficiently high
that they are at least in the medium-gray shaded area in panel (c) of Figure 3.1. A
few examples are Albania in the late 1990’s, Georgia in the late 1990’s and Honduras
in the late 1980’s and late 1990’s.
Column 2 of Table 3.3 shows the effects when we consider democracy as one single
variable rather than two. Its effect is modeled with a third-degree polynomial to allow
for effects similar to those found by Davenport and Armstrong (2004). The results
are roughly similar, though they depart on one important point. Figure 3.2 shows
the conditional effect of democracy on repression. Here, there is some modest level of
democratic pacification gained as the most autocratic countries begin to democratize.
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Then, there is a significant plateau at which point no gains are felt to democratiza-
tion. Then, as countries reach roughly the upper quarter of the democracy scores,
democratization starts to bear fruit again with respect to integrity rights. There are
a number of countries roughly on the verge of democratic pacification here as well.
However, they are a set of countries quite different from the ones mentioned above.
Of the 147 country-years found to be poised on the brink of democratic pacifica-
tion above when considering voice and veto, none of them reach the critical value of
democracy required by model 2. All of the countries found to be poised on the brink
of pacification here (e.g., Argentina (1984-1989), India (1984-1991) and South Korea
(1989-1995)) have either higher voice or veto scores than those countries found in the
previous discussion.
Finally, what of Davenport’s (2007b, 179) claim that, “... results consistently
reveal that Voice ... exceeds the influence of Veto.” Because the effects are conditional
here, it is a more difficult task to assess this claim than it might seem. To get a sense of
what this might look like, I did the following. I will discuss this in terms of the overall
effect of veto, but I also performed the mirror image of this process for voice. First,
make a sequence of 100 evenly spaced points from the minimum to the maximum of
voice, call this voice0. Then, for each point in voice0, I found the nearest 50 posterior
means of the voice latent variable.11 I then calculated the standard deviation of veto
for each of these 50 points. I repeat this for each of the points in turn, which results
in a column vector of 100 standard deviations, call it σveto. Then, I took the last 5000
chain values for the predictive model coefficients β3 and β4 from equation 3.10, call
this βveto0 , which is a 5000× 2 matrix. Next, I made the matrix:














veto, which is now a 5000 × 1
vector of effects, the quantiles of which can be taken to form a 95% credible interval.
The idea here is to acknowledge that in places where the conditional coefficients are
extreme (e.g., in the extreme values of voice for the conditional effect of veto and in
the extreme values of veto, for the conditional effect of voice), there may be very little
data or the data that is there might have very low variance. This is an attempt to
account for the various amounts of variance at the different levels of the conditioning
variable. This was done for both variables with the following results - the total effect
of veto is -2.56 with a 95% interval of (-4.87, -0.45) and the total effect of voice is -4.06
with a 95% interval of (-6.76, -1.62). Davenport’s claim is then borne out, though
with the caveat that the difference in the two total effects calculated this way is not
statistically different from zero.
The results above have important implications on both substantive and method-
ological grounds. From a methodological point of view, this research is a rather large
step forward for the democracy-repression nexus. Until now, researchers have not
been taking full advantage of the wealth of data that exists on the various aspects
of democracy. By pooling these measures together, it allows the strengths of each
to shine through while eliminating or at least mitigating the measurement errors. I
demonstrated above that even though one measure for voice and one measure for veto
are obtained, it is possible to look back at the values of the indicators that would be
expected by certain values of the measurement model. Often when dimension reduc-
tion techniques are used, we abstract from the underlying substance that generated
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the latent variable. This practice is clearly to our detriment. It is not necessary that
the specifics of the substantive indicators completely give way to a more abstract,
conceptual definition. Both the abstract and the concrete are useful here.
Substantively, this is also an interesting step forward. Though others have consid-
ered this type of strategy in a less sophisticated way (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al.
2005, Davenport 1997, 2007b, Davenport and Armstrong 2004), they have often done
so without investigating or even acknowledging the inter-relatedness of these various
aspects of democracy. This work shows that these two concepts are not independent
of each other. It does not make sense to think inferentially about a country with low
voice and high veto because such countries are very rare if not completely unobserved.
When considering which countries are most likely to benefit from democratization ei-
ther on voice, veto or both, it is important to consider which countries have values
likely to be in the range where democratization can help.
The results above suggest that the operationalization of democracy does matter.
Even though the substantive effects are quite similar (i.e., that democratic pacification
happens only when multiple aspects of democracy already exist), the implications for
which countries are most likely to benefit from democratization is quite different. The
threshold when considering both voice and veto seems considerably lower than the
threshold when considering a single democracy variable. Below, I try to pull apart
these effects by considering more carefully how the relationships should exist and how
the models should be constructed.
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Table 3.2: Measurement Model Results
Model 1 Model 2
Voice Veto Repression Democracy Repression
log(Gates) 1.000 1.000
NA NA
Alvarez et al 2.754 2.239
(2.418, 3.144) (2.021, 2.480)
Bernhard et al 1.252 1.169
(1.135, 1.378) (1.068, 1.274)
Competitiveness 1.503 1.788
of Exec. Recruitment (1.405, 1.600) (1.677, 1.903)
Competitiveness 2.184 1.927
of Participation (2.046, 2.339) (1.819, 2.040)
log(Checks) 1.000 0.249
NA (0.239, 0.260)
Political Constraints (III) 0.506 0.083
(0.466, 0.547) (0.081, 0.085)
Executive Constraints 6.637 0.959
(6.142, 7.131) (0.938, 0.981)
Law & Order 2.186 0.357
(1.982, 2.398) (0.337, 0.379)
Sub-Federal Veto 3.181 0.559
(2.618, 3.794) (0.463, 0.659)
Torture 1.000 1.000
NA NA
Extrajudicial Killing 1.885 1.896
(1.626, 2.186) (1.698, 2.114)
Forced Disappearance 1.587 1.663
(1.357, 1.856) (1.473, 1.877)
Political Imprisonment 1.330 1.331
(1.140, 1.545) (1.194, 1.484)
SD(Posterior Means) 2.225 0.346 1.718 2.215 1.758
DIC 47285.9 48108
Note: Main entries are the coefficients on the latent variables (think factor pattern coefficients or
“loadings”). Below are 95% credible intervals. The intercepts and threshold parameters are omitted
in the interest of space, but are available from the author upon request.
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Table 3.3: Predictive Model Results
Model 1 Model 2
Intercept -0.429 -0.396
(-0.654, -0.223) (-0.565, -0.243)
Repressiont−1 0.836 0.865













GDP/capita (in $10,000) -0.116 -0.055
(-0.177, -0.059) (-0.102, -0.008)
log(Population) (in 1,000) 0.053 0.042
(0.033, 0.075) (0.026, 0.059)
Civil War 0.385 0.269
(0.219, 0.572) (0.127, 0.416)
Interstate War 0.086 0.086
(-0.065, 0.237) (-0.04, 0.215)
Note: Main entries are posterior means of the regression coefficients in the predictive
piece of the structural model. The entries below are 95% credible intervals.
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Pr(Alvarez et al = 1) 0.015 0.261
Pr(Bernhard et al = 1) 0.032 0.122
Competitiveness of Exec. Recruitment 2 3





Political Constraints (III) 0.123 0.218
Executive Constraints 3 4
Law & Order 3 4
Pr(Sub-Federal Veto = 1) 0.025 0.044
Note: Entries in this table represent the values of the observed variables at the thresh-
olds of democratic pacification. These represent the expected values of the observed
values at the point where the conditional coefficient for voice (first column) and veto
(second column) become statistically significant.
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Note: Panels (a) and (b) show the conditional coefficients and 95% credible in-
tervals for voice and veto, respectively. Panel (c) shows the interactive surface
(β2Voice + β3Veto + β4Voice × Veto). The lightest color represents the entire sur-
face. The next darkest shade represents the areas where 1) the predicted surface is
significantly different from zero and 2) the density evaluated at the center corner of
the lower-right grid cell is in the highest 75% of all of the densities at the lower-left
corners of all the grid cells. The darkest region is similar to the above, except only
the highest 50% of the densities are used.
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It is suggested that polities where citizens have the right to sanction government
leaders will see lower levels of state repression. The argument hinges on the account-
ability of government officials to voters. Assume that citizens have single-peaked
preferences along the repression dimension and that they vote based on their prefer-
ences. If this is so, the leader’s repressive policies will have to be such that a plurality
of the citizens are closer to this policy choice than the policies offered by any of the
leader’s competitors in the election. If this is not the case, then the leader will be
voted out of office. Otherwise, the leader will retain his position. The logic here is
the same as for any unidimensional spatial voting model [e.g., Downs (1957)].
Davenport (2007b) suggests that for citizens to exercise their voice they must have
the ability to participate in the political process and they must be able to choose
among a set of diverse alternatives. The logic of the first proposition is straight-
forward - when citizens are able to participate in the political process, leaders are
accountable for their decisions. As for the second case, the more distinct viewpoints
are represented the less likely it is that even a smaller minority can be repressed with-
out generating some social and political backlash. The logic for the second proposition
seems a bit shakier than the first.
When are citizens able to sanction the chief executive directly? Only in presiden-
tial systems are citizens able to vote up or down on the one person who will lead the
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government. The connection between votes and leadership of the government is a bit
more tenuous in parliamentary systems, though often the choices are obvious. Often
the only real difference is the inability to vote independently for a local representative
and the national leader. However, if the vote is simply to send a message to the ruling
party, then there is often a clear ability to do just that.
Work designed to “test,” this mechanism has been, I feel, generally unsuccess-
ful. The lack of success is not with generating significant and seemingly interesting
findings; rather, the lack of success has been in fleshing out the extent to which the
underlying mechanism is operative. Much of the work has shown that conditions ex-
ist where this mechanism might be working, but it fails to demonstrate convincingly
that it does operate (i.e., that electoral accountability drives repression). Daven-
port (2007b) attempts to test this hypothesis by using the Vanhanen (2000) data
on competition and participation. The suggestion here is that as voter participation
increases and one-party hegemony decreases, leaders should be more likely to be sanc-
tioned by voters. It is not obvious that these represent sufficient conditions for the
mechanism to work. The underlying mechanism does not imply that a greater level
of competition in free, multi-party elections ought to lead to leaders being removed
for repressive policy. Rather, it suggests that leaders will modify their behavior based
on the existence or potential of an electoral sanction. Whether 50% or 60% of the
population participates in a free and fair election should have no real bearing on this
question, unless one assumes the electorate is unevenly distributed along the dimen-
sion based on likelihood of voting. If the electoral constraint is latent (i.e., it only
really matters that it could be exercised), then suffrage (or potential participation)
matters more than realized participation in any election. Rather than considering
these variables that will, generally, separate non-democracies from democracies, I fo-
cus only on democracies to tease out the effects of different democratic arrangements
on repression. While it might seem like this poses a selection problem, it seems rea-
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sonable for two reasons. First, I am not selecting on the dependent variable, rather
on one of the independent variables. Further, this practice follows the advice of both
Achen (2002) and Clarke (2005) who suggest testing theories in more homogenous
domains.
4.1 Salience of Political Repression
As I suggested above, a considerable amount of focus has been placed on global
investigation of the concepts of interest here. However, many of the theories we have
propose interesting within-country differences for different types of democracies. To
leverage some interesting data that has, until now, been unused by this literature, I
restrict the focus in the manuscript to a set of democracies covered by the comparative
manifestos project (Budge et al. 2001, Klingemann et al. 2007). These are all, for at
least some of the time under investigation, multi-party democracies with more or less
free and fair elections. Due to the temporal domain of the repression data, I focus on
the years 1980-present. This focus on only democracies restricts the sample to about
40% of the independent countries which is a relatively small subset. Further, the
inferences made here will provide unprecedented detail in the working of repression
within democracies. By concentrating on this particular group, it is possible to test
theories about the differences between democracies, rather than the differences among
democracies and non-democracies.
I first consider the extent to which voters may use potential repressive policy
as a means for casting their votes. To do this, I used data from the Comparative
Manifesto Project. The CMP has provided a coding of party manifestos across 25
countries from the years 1945-2003 and a further 24 countries from 1990-2003 (Budge
et al. 2001, Klingemann et al. 2007). The manifestos are coded into 56 exhaustive
and mutually exclusive categories. The final numbers represent the percentage of
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each manifesto devoted to the each of the 56 topics. These topics are divided across
seven areas - external relations, freedom and democracy, the political system, the
economy, welfare and quality of life, fabric of society and social groups. There is also
one category for sentences that did not fit neatly into any other category. While these
have been criticized for the way they’ve been aggregated to form a scale of overall
left-right party placement (See Bakker, Edwards and Netjes 2006, Laver, Benoit and
Garry 2003, Laver and Garry 2000, for some critiques), they nonetheless do present
valuable information on what parties found important.
For my specific purposes, there are two items in the manifesto project’s coding
the seem useful. The variable National Way of Life: Positive (per601) is defined as,
“appeals to patriotism and/or nationalism; suspension of some freedoms in order to
protect the state against subversion; support for established national ideals,” (Volkens
2005, 13). There other is Law and Order: Positive, which is defined as, “enforcement
of all laws, actions against crime, support and resources for police, tougher attitudes
in course,” (Volkens 2005, 13). I use these two measures to calculate the percentage
of each party’s manifesto devoted to these two measures combined. While I grant
that these are not perfectly related to repression per se, they appear as reasonable
proxies for the concepts of interest. As you will see in the ensuing investigation, these
perform as expected.
The percentage of each party’s manifesto devoted to these two items can be
thought of in a couple of different ways. First, it can be thought to convey the
salience of that issue for that party. That is to say, a party that concentrates 50%
of its manifesto on these issues ought to be more interested in policy on this issue
than a party which spends only 10% of its manifesto on these items. Another way
to think about this is in terms of position. That is to say, we can think of these
issues as providing a measure of each party’s placement on the repression dimension
of political competition. To enable this measure to be used with country-level data, I
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execute the following transformation. First, I define s as a column-vector of the seat
shares of each party (as a proportion) and m as a column-vector of the percentage of
times each party’s manifesto mentions either the law & order or national way of life
(positive) questions as a percentage of the total number of statements made. Then
s′m is the country’s measure of the salience of repression. This amounts to a set-share
weighted sum individual party repression salience.
As suggested above, conventional wisdom proposes two relevant hypothesis: 1)
citizen opinion with respect to repression should be relatively low and as such, 2)
government repression will generally be unrelated to public opinion on the subject
(because there will be very little variance). That is to say, when governments re-
press, they will be doing so against the will of the people - taking a calculated risk
that ensuring security will eventually pay electoral benefits. By way of description,
Figure 4.1 shows the unconditional distribution of the repressive salience scores. The
scores tend, on average, to be between zero and ten. However, there are certainly
some larger numbers as well. The highest values are around 20% - suggesting an av-
erage of around 20% of manifestos in that country-election were devoted to these two
issues. Figure 4.2 shows the salience of repression over time across the 49 countries
under investigation here (i.e., the 49 countries covered by the Comparative Manifesto
Project). A simple linear latent trajectory model suggests that the trajectories are
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generally positive.1 This suggests that over time, repression is becoming more salient.
This is not surprising given the rise in high-profile international terrorist events in
the early 2000’s.
4.2 Salience and Security
As an intermediate step to the ultimate goal, I consider the extent to which the
salience of repression tends to follow security-relevant events. The suggestion Dav-
enport (2007b) makes is that repression can be used as means of security territory
against threats from within and without. As such, in the wake of revealed vulnera-
bility, parties should generally increase the amount of manifestos devoted to law &
order and preserving the national way of life. Using data from the Memorial Institute
for the Prevention of Terrorism (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism
2006) as well as ITERATE (Mickolus et al. 2003) I found the number of fatalities
1The latent trajectory model is simply a multi-level linear model with random intercepts and
random slopes on a linear year term.
Salienceij = αj + βjyearij + εij (4.1)
where
αj = γ00 + ω1j (4.2)
βj = γ01 + ω2j (4.3)
The errors of the random intercepts and slopes are assumed to be multivariate normal:
 ω1
ω2
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Note: The figure represents the seat-share-weighted sum of salience scores for items
per601 and per605 in the Comparative Manifesto Project data. These refer to law &
order and national way of life (positive), respectively. Numbers exist for each country-
election and are connected with a straight line between elections.
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due to terrorist incidents in each year (and election cycle).2 To do this, I simply took
the maximum reported in each country in each year by both sources. The resulting
measure is then used as a proxy for security threats.
By way of a short digression, the terrorism measure will serve the same purpose
here that civil and interstate war experience serve in traditional models in this field.
The 49 countries under consideration here are all democracies with some degree of
multi-party competition. As such, civil and interstate war experience do not do a
particularly good job of distinguishing countries on the level of internal and external
security threats. Most countries in this subset are free of both internal and external
wars over the time-period in question.
To estimate the effect of terrorist events on the salience of repression, I aggregate
the data by election cycle. Specifically, I sum the total number of fatalities in the
previous election cycle. For example if election 1 is held in 1995 and election 2 is
held in 1999, then I predict salience in the 1999 platforms with the sum of terrorist
fatalities in that country from 1995-1999. While it may be reasonable to suggest that
parties change their position on repression continuously between elections in response
to the ever-changing security environment, manifestos only change at election times.
Thus, these are not a particularly good tool for picking up intra-election change. As
such, the results are preliminary and instructive in nature. Findings here will likely
be underestimates of the party’s responsiveness to terrorism.
The findings here confirm what Davenport (2007b) suggested - parties tend to
focus more on law & order and preserving the national way of life following terrorist
attacks that generate fatalities. The general finding is not changed by the inclusion of
2Exploratory analysis suggested that fatalities were the most important predictor of salience
of repression. That is to say, injuries or the raw number of terrorist attacks did less well. This
suggests that citizens are responding, in general, to serious threats to national security. There is
little evidence of knee-jerk reactions to terrorist incidents that claim no lives.
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the lagged dependent variable, though the absolute magnitude of the instantaneous
effect decreases. The statistical results are in Table 4.1
Table 4.1: Predicting Salience of Repression with Terrorist Fatalities
MM OLS MM OLS
Intercept 3.963 4.211 1.608 1.796
(0.242) (0.238) (0.292) (0.292)
Salience of Repressiont−1 0.658 0.630
(0.059) (0.059)
Terrorist Fatalitiest−1 0.030 0.026 0.018 0.019
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
R2 0.147 0.496
Note: The main entries are coefficient estimates, with parentheses in standard errors.
The dependent variable is the salience of repression at time t. Due to the presence
of outliers, I present not only the OLS results, but also the robust regression results.
These were calculated using an MM estimate with a Huber weight function Andersen
(2008).
The substantive effects are not overwhelming here. Fatalities range from zero to
2756 (US in 2001-2004). The substantive effects suggest that 100 fatalities should
increase the salience of repression by somewhere from two to three percent. About
three percent of the cases have fatality figures bigger than 100. Thus, this is instruc-
tive, but is not a result that demands more attention. Simply stated, when terrorist
events generate large levels of fatalities, it appears that parties move in the direction
of providing more security, perhaps by (temporarily) eliminating some freedoms in
an effort to secure the country’s territory.
Thus far, two pieces of information have been generated. First, there is variance
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in the seat-share weighted sum of party positions on repression. It is a relatively
short jump to conclude that there is variance in public opinion about repression,
both across countries and over time. These two pieces of evidence suggest that the
idea that citizens universally prefer lower levels of repression is, quite simply, false.
4.3 Salience and Observed Repression
Now, I move to understanding the effect that salience has on actual, observed
repression. The idea here is that as repression becomes more salient across the board,
repressive policy should become more harsh as repressive policies also respond to
security-relevant events. To accomplish this goal, I use the same data as above that
was aggregated by election cycle. First, consider the bivariate scatterplot between the
mean of repression and the salience of repression in Figure 4.3. The relationship here
seems relatively strong and linear. However, there are some interesting points. First,
there are a number of countries with relatively high repression, where repression plays
a relatively small part of electoral competition. These are the points in the upper
left-hand corner of the plot. Of these six points, four of them belong to Turkey. In
fact, these are the four election cycles in Turkey’s post-war electoral history with the
greatest number of political parties running for seats - indicating more contentious
electoral politics. I address contentious politics directly later on, so I leave a deeper
discussion of these possibilities to that chapter. The other two points represent one
election-cycle each for Georgia and Croatia. The other two were the first elections in
both countries, so the higher levels of repression were likely legacies of autocracy.
There is also another set of countries with unusually high salience of repression.
Of the six points with salience of repression greater than 13, two belong to Israel,
marking the period from 1981-1988. There were certainly conflicts in Israel at this
time including the South Lebanon Conflict over most of this period, but nothing out
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of the ordinary for Israel. One of the points belongs to Russia, from 2003-2007. Over
this period, relationships with Chechnya were certainly tumultuous, to the extent that
Chechans engaged in a series of terrorist attacks against Russia from 2002-2004. The
level of repression indicated by the CIRI data are certainly consistent with reports of
repression around this time. Another belongs to Azerbaijan’s first election. Finally,
the last one belongs to the US from 2000-2004. This is obviously the time of the
terrorist bombings in New York and Washington, DC. It is no surprise that the
US shows up here given its policies on torture and rendition directly following the
bombings.


















































































































































































































Both groups of points mentioned above are unusual (i.e., outliers) on one dimen-
sion. They are not regression outliers (i.e., they do not make big differences to the
regression line) because the first group has big residuals and almost no leverage and
the second group has big leverage, but quite small residuals. The figure suggests
that the line describing all of the points is not all that much different from the line
describing all of the points except the ones mentioned explicitly above. If anything,
the outliers tend to dampen the strength of the relationship. The trend seems to
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be relatively clear, as repression becomes more salient, actual repression tends to
increase. This suggests and addendum to Davenport’s (2007b), “vote the bastard’s
out,” idea. In fact, sometimes, citizens might be, “voting the bastards in!” When
security is threatened, citizens may, indeed, have a preference for repressive leaders.
A simple statistical model confirms that the relationship is statistically significant
(see Table 4.2).3 Here, I estimate the equation:
Mean Repression = β0 + β1Salience + ε (4.8)
The results presented in Table 4.2. Repression ranges from roughly -5 to 5, a 10-point
increase in the salience of repression should result in an increase in actual repression
of about 2.5 points (or around 25% of the scale). This is both substantively and
3As repression is a latent variable (i.e., an estimate with uncertainty), a simple model that employs
the posterior mean will tend to under-estimate the model uncertainty. Following Armstrong, Duch
and Bakker (2007), I treat the latent variable as a severe case of missing data - where all observations
are missing. Then I employ standard multiple imputation technology (see Rubin 1987, Schafer 1997)
to propagate the latent variable uncertainty through the second-stage predictive model. Specifically,
I use the last 100 iterations of the markov chain for each value of repression, making a matrix that
is N × 100. Then, I run 100 predictive models with coefficient vectors β1, . . . , β100 and variance-
covariance matrices Σ1, . . . ,Σ100. The overall coefficient estimate, denoted Q̄, is simply the mean
of the 100 coefficient estimates. The total variance of those coefficients is a function of both the
inherent sampling variability in each model (Ū) and the variance of the repression scores across






















statistically meaningful. Looking at the observed ranges across all the countries here,
the average range of the salience of repression is around 5. That is to say, the salience
of repression in the average country has a range of around 5 (i.e., the maximum is 5
points higher than the minimum in the average country). This should generate about
a 1.25 unit change in actual repression (roughly 10% of the range).
Table 4.2: Regression Results for Observed Repression as a Function of Salience of
Repression
OLS MM






Note: Main entries are coefficients resulting from the process described above in foot-
note 3 (page 59), with country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. The depen-
dent variable is the mean of repression. The R2 here is approximate because the R2
for each randomly drawn repression point is slightly different. The range is roughly
(0.15, 0.19).
The first-order concerns have thus been satisfied - actual repression seems to be
a function of the salience of repression. Now, to aid in the interpretation of what
this actually means, I consider what would be the expected change in the indicators
of repression for the changes in salience seen in each country. These are shown in
Figure 4.4. First, a bit of explanation about how the figure was made. You will
remember from 3.4.1 that the measurement model relates the latent variable to the
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observed indicators through a regression-type model (here an ordered logit). As such,
it is possible to get predictions for each of the indicators based on any particular
level of repression. Also, the discussion above suggests that actual repression can
be expressed as a stochastic linear function of the salience of repression. Thus, it
is possible to get from the salience of repression (through two equations) to the
indicator values expected for that level of salience. Now, which values of salience
would be most instructive? Here, I use the minimum and maximum in each country.4
Most countries do not change. Even though they experience changes in salience,
the changes are not enough to induce predicted changes on any of the indicators.
However, there are some interesting patterns. Torture is by far the variable with the
greatest number of changes (16 of the 42 countries would be expected to experience
a change). Only 4 of the 42 countries change on killings and political imprisonment
and none change on disappearances. What can be said, then, is that in this set
of democracies (remember, all of these countries have multi-party elections), when
repression becomes most salient, torture is almost as likely as not and killings and
political imprisonment are not out of the question.
Theory, such as it is, has suggested other possible causes of repression. Namely,
GDP/capita and population have been shown to mitigate and exacerbate the use of
repression, respectively. Money is thought to buy options – with greater resources,
authorities have avenues whereby they can placate potential dissidents. Countries
with greater populations are thought to have more strain on their limited resources,
4Technically, the measurement model equation suggests that:
Pr(Yij <= m) =
1
1 + exp [− (κmj − (γj − Repressioni))]
(4.9)
where i refers to the N country-years and j refers to the each of the four observed indicators of
repression. In the above, I simply replace Repressioni with: β0 + β1Salience + ε, estimated in
equation4.8.
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Note: Predicted categories when salience takes on its lowest values are represented by
an open circle “o” and predicted categories when salience takes on its highest values
are represented by an “x”.
all else equal. This should breed more discontent and in turn increase the demand
for repression. As argued above, threats to domestic tranquility can also increase
the demand for repression. As such, all of these are included as controls in the
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model. Table 4.3 shows the multiple regression of the mean of repression on salience,
and the controls mentioned above. In essence, the salience measure is a proxy for the
demand of repression. The fact that both population and GDP/capita are statistically
significant means either A) they act on repression in some other way than influencing
factors that increase or decrease the demand for repression or B) salience is a poor
proxy for the demand of repression. These continue to go in the right direction, so
I suspect that a bit of both A and B are happening here. Salience is probably not
a perfect measure of demand for repression and it is likely that both demographic
variables effect repression through yet unexplored theoretical avenues.
For the current work, the important result is that of salience. Salience remains
an important predictor, both substantively and statistically, of repression. Further,
the effect of the security variable (fatalities from terrorist events) is not statistically
different from zero. This suggests that whatever effect terrorist events have - they
have through increasing the salience of repression. This seems a reasonable result and
argues that the salience variable has at least some value as a proxy for the demand
for repression. Figure 4.5 provides information similar to that provided by Figure 4.4,
though for the multiple regression model. This figure provides the predicted changes
for each of the repression indicators for a change in salience over the observed range in
each country holding the other variables constant at their median value in each coun-
try. There are a number of similarities between the two graphs, especially in Western
Europe and North America. However, in Central/Eastern Europe and Russia, the
demographic pressures may repression more likely at the highest salience values in
those countries. That is to say, the relatively low GDP/capita in these countries will
lead to increased repression for similar values of repressive salience.
Perhaps these demographic indicators, especially GDP/capita, are also capturing
regime stability. In stable regimes, small demands for repression could be dismissed
more easily. Low, but non-zero, demands for repression are unlikely to result in the
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Table 4.3: Multiple Regression Results for Observed Repression
Intercept −6.039
(0.278)
Salience of Repression 0.222
(0.009)
Fatalities (in 100’s) 0.044
(0.027)






Note: Main entries are coefficients arrived at by the method suggested in footnote 3
(page 59), with their corresponding standard errors in parentheses. The dependent
variable is observed repression. The R2 here is approximate because the R2 for each
randomly drawn repression point is slightly different. The range is roughly (0.40,0.50).
catastrophic end to a stable democratic regime. The same may not be true of a
less stable, perhaps newer, democracy. Leaders in these regimes may feel as though
protecting the security of the regime is of paramount importance, even at the expense
of liberty. One very simple way to investigate this proposition is to consider, for each
country, the GDP/capitas and the year of the first entry into the Manifesto data.
The first date of entry into the Manifesto data marks the first multi-party election in
the country. These two are correlated at -0.61, suggesting that newer countries have,
on average, lower GDP/capita figures. There were basically three waves of inclusion
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Figure 4.5: Predicted Changes in Repressive Indicators for Changes in Salience of























































































































































































































Note: Predicted categories when salience takes on its lowest values are represented by
an open circle “o” and predicted categories when salience takes on its highest values
are represented by an “x”. All other variables are held at the median value for each
country.
in the data. Many appeared in the late 1940’s or early 1950’s. A few other countries
appeared in the mid 1970’s and finally another group appeared in the late 1980’s and
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early 1990’s. Figure 4.6 shows the box-plot of GDP/capita by these three waves of
inclusion in the data.










By considering these three different waves, it is possible to parse the effect of
GDP/capita and stability. For example, it is possible that poorer, older countries see
less repression than newer, richer countries. Further, it is possible that the effect of
GDP/capita is different in these three groups. It seems reasonable that GDP/capita
could make a big difference in newer countries. These resources may provide a level
of stability that cannot be provided by longevity.
Table 4.4 replicates the results in Table 4.3 but allows the effect of GDP/capita
to be conditional on the entry group into the Manifesto data. The reference group for
the entry variable is 1945-1965. The table shows that the coefficient for GDP/capita
is negative, but not significant for the reference group. The conditional coefficient for
the second entry group is 0.050 with a t-statistic of 1.14 and the conditional coefficient
for the third entry group is -0.274 with a t-statistic of -4.917. Thus, GDP/capita
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matters only in the newest set of democracies. This lends some credibility to the
argument that the stability that cannot be provided by longevity, may be provided
by resources.
4.3.1 Between- vs. Within-Country Salience and Political
Repression
Finally, I take this result one step further. Throughout this investigation, I have
treated these observations as though they were independent. This was useful to get
a sense of the global relationship, but it has overlooked an important aspect of the
structure of the data – namely that these data are years nested within countries. To
this end, I estimate the following multilevel model that acknowledges the structure
in the data and allows the estimation of unit effects.
Repressionit = αi + β1,iGDP/capitait + β2,ilog(Population)it (4.10)
+ β3Salienceit + β4Fatalities/100it + εit
αi = γ0,0 + γ0,1Saliencei + γ0,2Entry > 1980i + νi,0 (4.11)
β1,i = γ1,0 + γ1,1Entry > 1980i + νi,1 (4.12)
β2,i = γ2,0 + νi,2 (4.13)
Notice, here since the entry date was really identifying the late third-wave countries
entering in the late 1980’s, I simply include a dummy for entry into the dataset after
1980. The somewhat complicated second level effects represent both the product of
a bit of model searching and advice from previous models. Both GDP/capita and
population are variables that would seem obvious candidates for differential effects by
country. I am particularly interested in whether the salience of repression retains its
within-country predictive power when the country-mean is included as a predictor of
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the intercept. Finally, since the date a country enters the sample is a country-specific
effect, it does not have a level-one effect, rather it’s level-two effect is to predict one
of the level-one parameters (Snijders and Bosker 1999).
The results in Table 4.5 show that many of the results remain significant when we
consider the appropriate nesting structure at the individual country-year level. The
salience of repression result seems to be generally a between-country effect, rather
than a within-country effect. A bit of investigation showed that this was largely a
function of allow random slopes on GDP/capita (until this modification, the indi-
vidual salience term remained significant). A statistical comparison of models both
with and without variable slopes on GDP/capita provides clear evidence that the for-
mer is preferred. Further, the random slopes on population also survive a statistical
model comparison, though seem to be less detrimental to the individual-level result
of repressive salience.
I have argued throughout this chapter that salience provides a measure of demand
for repression. Specifically, as parties tend to talk more about repression, that re-
flects an increased salience in repression among the general public. This demand for
repression is often met with an increased supply of repression by governments. A con-
siderable amount of evidence can be amassed to show that there is a within-country
relationship, however, when a multilevel model is estimated which allows for different
between- and within-country effects, I find that the salience measure effectively cap-
tures between-country variation. In countries where salience is, on average, higher,
repression is also, on average, higher. Further to that point, it does seem as though
citizens have variable tastes for repression and that governments, as they ought to be
according to electoral accountability, are willing to accommodate.
The prospects for domestic democratic peace, are then somewhat tenuous. They
depend, at least in part, on the preferences of the citizens. If citizens are moved to
react sharply to their security environment, the results here suggest that governments
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could very well respond with repression.
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Salience of Repression 0.192
(0.060)
Fatalities (by 100) 0.023
(0.030)








GDP/capita × Entry: 1966-1985 0.093
(0.090)




Note: Main entries are coefficients arrived at by the method suggested in footnote 3
(page 59), with their corresponding standard errors in parentheses. The dependent
variable is observed repression. The R2 here is approximate because the R2 for each
randomly drawn repression point is slightly different. The range is roughly (0.48,0.58).
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Table 4.5: Multilevel Model of Repression as a Function of Salience
Intercept -10.672
(1.898)
Salience of Repression 0.213
(0.088)
Entry > 1980 3.146
(0.830)
GDP/capita (by 1000) 0.092
(0.032)




Salience of Repression -0.005
(0.015)
Fatalities (by 100) -0.004
(0.018)
σ̄ν0 3.807
σν0: 95% CI (0.000, 9.256)
σ̄ν1 0.136
σν1: 95% CI (0.098, 0.183)
σ̄ν2 0.469
σν2: 95% CI (0.229, 0.880)
σ̄ε 0.367
σε: 95% CI (0.333, 0.403)
Note: Main entries are multilevel model coefficients using the strategy described in
footnote 3 (page 59). Entries in parentheses are standard errors. σ̄ν0, σ̄ν1, σ̄ν2, and
σ̄ε were obtained by taking the empirical mean of the parameters across m = 100
models. The 95% CI’s for those parameters were obtained by computing the 2.5th and




The argument here is relatively straightforward, but has been generally misrep-
resented by the literature thus far. The literature suggests (at least implicitly) that
checks alone are enough to bring about lower levels of repression. This line of reason-
ing is antithetical to the veto players literature. Tsebelis (2002) suggests that veto
players analysis can point to times or contexts where policy change is rather more
or less likely. It is, by definition, a dynamic theory of policy stability and change.
Further, Tsebelis admits that often as researchers, we do not know the status quo
policy. I think the status quo might be a bit more clear here, but the veto players
analysis was designed explicitly to generate results without knowledge of the posi-
tion of the status quo. In the current context, that means that veto players analysis
should suggest when repressive policy is more or less likely to change regardless of the
baseline level of repression. Thus, the argument that as the number of veto players
increases we would predict a particular policy or even a range of policies be chosen
seems invalid.
If Tsebelis (2002) is the foundation of the veto players argument forwarded by
Davenport (2007b), then what can we learn from veto players with respect to po-
litical repression? The first, thing to realize is that Tsebelis (2002) suggests that
comparisons across countries are not valid – “it would be [equally] inappropriate to
compare two different systems, one with three veto players and one with four and
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conclude that the second produces more policy stability than the first” (p.25). Thus,
the current practice of including the level of veto players in a model of repressive
behavior is, technically speaking, not appropriate. As suggested above, analysis on
this level is about policy change. The literature has tended to consider the number
of veto players to generate an absolute result – more veto players equals lower repres-
sion. Rather, what we should consider be looking for is a relative result – changes
in repressive policy over time should be relatively smaller when there are more veto
players, rather than fewer, within a single country.
While Tsebelis has a number of different proposition that include the number and
position of veto players as well as sequencing and agenda setting, there are a couple
that are of particular interest. Specifically, I consider the extent of support in the
data for two propositions. First, that increasing the number of veto players should
increase the stability and second, that as the distance between veto players increases,
so should policy stability. The application to repressive policy should be obvious,
though I discuss it with respect to both propositions below.
5.1 Number of Veto Players
Consider Tsebelis’ proposition 1.1: “[t]he addition of a new veto player increases
policy stability or leaves it the same (either by decreasing the size of the winset of
the status quo, or by increasing the size of the unanimity core, or by leaving both
the same).” (Tsebelis 2002, 25). This suggests that within each country, a change in
the veto players should make repressive policy more stable (i.e., policies should have
lower variance). This proposition requires that there be within-country variance on
the veto measure. Figure 5.1 shows the variance of veto over time within countries.
As you can see, there are many countries that do not have interesting variation on
this measure. The consolidated, relatively older democracies seem to be relatively
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stable with respect to veto players. On the other hand, newer democracies seem to
have a considerable amount of variance. Thus, one would expect veto players to make
a difference in repressive strategy in the late third-wave democratizers, but changes
in veto players simply don’t exist in the other countries as a general rule and as such,
should be unable to influence repressive policy in the way suggested by Tsebelis.
Despite this general pattern, there are a couple of outliers – France and Turkey.
This makes sense as in France in 1986, Jacques Chirac came to power in an election
that brought about an enormous change in the seat shares held by the main parties
which led to a switch from single-party majority government to a coalition govern-
ment. Turkey, on the other hand, appears to exhibit a secular trend in most of the
indicators over the time-period of interest here. The only exception is the sub-federal
veto, which continues to obtain a value of zero over the entire period for Turkey.
To evaluate the hypothesis - that within a country, more veto players should lead
to policy stability, I use the veto variable calculated above in chapter 3. I calculate
the difference in repressive policy choice between years t and t + 1. Then, I regress
the absolute value of that difference on the value of veto at time t. The expectation,
if repressive policy follows the model suggested by Tsebelis and assuming the existing
actors stay in the same places over time, higher values on the veto variable should
lead to smaller absolute changes in the next period. Again, rather than doing this
globally, I estimate a fixed effects model that includes country dummy variables and
an interaction between the country dummies and the veto variable. I also include the
difference in the salience of repression from time t to time t+1. This is to allow for the
fact that preferences may change over time. As the salience of repression increases,
generally I would expect repressive behavior to follow.
The results are less than encouraging here. Figure 5.2 shows the conditional
intercepts and coefficients for each country. The black points represent conditional
intercepts and coefficients that are statistically different from zero and the gray points
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Note: The values in the plots represent the posterior means of the veto latent variable
in each country in each year. In the interest of easing the identification of patterns,
I have omitted measures of uncertainty here. However, countries that appear to have
big changes do and countries that appear to have simply random variation over time,
generally do.
represent conditional coefficients and intercepts that are not statistically different
from zero. In general, most points are not different from zero. This is not especially
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surprising given that many countries had no real variance on the veto variable over
time. In absolute terms, there are some interesting findings. There are actually
some significant, positive coefficients. This suggests that net of changes in salience of
repression, as veto power gets more dispersed, changes in repressive policy increase.
This happens in Sweden and New Zealand.
One way to potentially reconcile this finding with the theoretical literature could
be that countries with higher variance in their veto player scores are the ones with
the biggest coefficients. While there certainly are countries with big variance that
seem to have big negative coefficients, there is no particularly strong statistical rela-
tionship here. This suggests that while there are certainly some countries that would
seem to follow the pattern suggested by theoretical work, it is not obvious that this
relationship is widespread and interesting with respect to repressive policy.
The fact that salience here is a characteristic that varies only by electoral cycle,
rather than by year (as the other measures) could be influential to the results. As
such, I calculate the variance of repression in each election cycle and then calculate
the mean of veto the veto latent variable. Then, I subset the data to include only
those countries with sufficiently many observations (≥ 5), this leaves 23 countries.
This model proves even less supportive as the adjusted R2 is, on average across the
100 simulated draws from the posterior, negative. Thus, there is surprisingly little
support for the idea that a changing constraint environment results in more stable
repressive policies.
This seems anomalous given the work of Tsebelis (2002). However, there could
be a couple of potential explanations. First, repressive policy might be, on average,
pretty stable regardless of the level of veto players. The fact that the effects are
insignificant certainly suggests that the results are essentially equally stable regardless
of the constraint environment. It could also be that repressive policy is not a policy
area that would see the situations required for these theoretical results to hold. Let
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Note: The points represent the conditional intercepts (left panel) and coefficients on
the veto variable (right panel) from an OLS model predicting absolute change in re-
pression with the veto latent variable. Points colored black are significantly different
from zero while those colored gray are not. The bars represent the 95% confidence
interval of the conditional intercept or coefficient.
me explain. As Olson (2000) suggests, rational leaders do not have a preference for
repression, meaning they do not seek repression as an end in itself, rather they use it
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as a means to an end, namely that of security.1 When security is threatened, public
opinion on repression and security can change quite rapidly and both citizens and
governments who would normally be staunch proponents of civil liberties now see the
tradeoff between liberty and security as a bit harder to evaluate (Davis 2007). At
the point when repressive policy changes, it is preceded by relatively large changes in
both the position of the veto players and public opinion.
All things considered, there seems relatively little support for the relationship
between the number of veto players and the stability of repressive policy. Now, I
move on to another important proposition from the veto players literature.
5.2 Distance Between Veto Players
Tsebelis (2002) also suggests that as veto players take positions more distant
from each other, policy stability should increase, (p, 30). Specifically, regardless of
the position of the status quo, as veto players move further apart, the size of the
winset shrinks and the size of the unanimity core increases. In relation to repression,
as veto players (e.g., coalition partners) have increasingly different positions on the
use of repressive tactics, such as torture, they are less likely to agree on a change to
the status quo policy and thus the status quo is likely to continue as the policy of
choice.
It is less obvious how the empirical investigation of this hypothesis ought to pro-
ceed. The reason for the ambiguity in this case is that it is somewhat difficult to obtain
the positions of each of the veto players. This is especially true for independent judi-
ciaries and sub-federal veto players. Further, by incorporating different measures of
constraints on different metrics, the resulting measure of constrained executives does
1This is consistent with Davenport’s (2007b) work suggesting that repression is generally used to
security territory against threats from within or without.
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not even really identify a number of veto players. Rather, it identifies a the relative
constraints on leaders such that higher numbers represent more constraints. Below,
I propose a few different ways of assessing support for this proposition.
First, I simply take the variance of party positions on repression in each election
cycle and regress variance in repressive strategy on these values along with a set of
country dummy variables. While the sign is in the right direction, negative, meaning
that variance in repressive policy is lower when variance in positions is higher, but the
coefficient is not statistically significant (p ≈ 0.7). This might not be the best way to
operationalize the dispersion of veto player ideal points as not all parties have a veto.
In an effort to adjust these values, I multiply the election-cycle variance in party
positions by the veto latent variable. This provides no additional leverage on the
problem as the coefficient remains negative, but statistically insignificant (p ≈ 0.4).
To properly address this hypothesis it would be necessary to know which parties
are in each coalition. In the absence of such information, I find the repressive policy
of the minimum winning adjacent coalition. This is the coalition of adjacent parties
on the repression dimension that has closest to, but still greater than 50% of the
legislative seats. Then, I take the seat-share weighted average of their position scores,
in a similar fashion to the way the salience score was calculated. Finally, I regress the
intra-electoral-cycle variance in repressive policy on the minimum winning coalition
variance.2 Unfortunately, this strategy does not change the results either. The results
remain statistically insignificant (p ≈ 0.4), though in the right direction.
Again, there is very little support for the veto players result with respect to
repression. There is at least one potential reasonable explanations here as well. It is
possible that I have not properly captured the “right,” variance in the veto players.
2Not every coalition will be a minimum winning coalition, but it does at least provide a slightly
better measure. The result will generally be to discount the position of small, extremist parties.
These may occasionally show up in the minimum winning coalition, but less often than not.
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Having tried a few different methods with quite similar results, I suspect that a better
operationalization of this measure would not yield much in the way of interesting new
results.
The results here seem somewhat contradictory to the current state of the literature
on constrained executives. Others have found this to be one of the most important
pieces of the puzzle with respect to state repression (Armstrong and Davenport 2003,
Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005, Davenport 2007b). If this is true, then why are
these results so paltry? It is largely from the fact that models using these concepts
are capitalizing on between-country variation rather than within-country variation,
which explicitly runs counter to the advice offered by Tsebelis (2002). A very simple
variance decomposition of the veto variable shows that the between country variation
(roughly 0.3) is about three times greater than the within-country variation. Thus, it
is very likely that models incorporating veto players as a variable are capitalizing on
this variation. Even more convincing on these grounds is the variance decomposition
of the repression variable. As suggested above, 80% of the countries in this study
do not have significant changes in their veto scores over the entire period. Here, the
between country variance (roughly 3) is an order of magnitude bigger than its within-
country counterpart. So, while the within country variance on the veto measure may
be up to the task, there is generally relatively little variance in repression over time
within each country. This suggests that our models might be good at identifying
relatively long-standing stable features of countries that lead them, as a rule, to
respect human rights or not, but that we may be, on average, less good at predicting




As Davenport (2007a,b) suggests, one cause of repression is internal insecurity
brought about by violent dissent. In essence, this raises the demand for repression
and as the theory goes, governments are more than willing to increase the supply
of repression. In this case, democracy works through its ability to decrease conflict.
Rather than decreasing it in absolute terms, democracy channels would-be violent
conflict into the political process. Davenport assumes that this relationship is op-
erative. In fact, it would seem that the aspects of democracy important to this
particular relationship are somewhat different from the sets of indicators considered
above. Voice required indicators of electoral accountability. Further, the policy posi-
tions on the repression dimension were important because they suggested the extent
to which the population was activated on this particular issue. Veto was concerned
with the constraints on the executive. Here, positions on the repressive dimension
are less important and the number of constraints on the executive is almost com-
pletely orthogonal in theory. Important to this hypothesis is that there are groups
representing diverse political views that have power of real potential for power in the
government.
Scholars often include civil and interstate war experience as controls in their mod-
els to “test,” this hypothesis (e.g., Davenport 2007b, Davenport and Armstrong 2004,
Poe and Tate 1994). One potential problem is that in current times (given the data
81
only generally go back in time until 1980), Western liberal democracies countries are
uncharacteristically free from civil and inter-state war. Thus, these variables may, in
fact, be picking up some of the effects of democracy. If the goal is to understand why
some democracies work better than others with respect to civil liberties, then some
more sensitive indicators will need to be chosen to test this mechanism. Davenport
(2007b) also includes measures of violent dissent, but others generally do not.
To show that this mechanism is at work requires two things. First, it requires that
violence be significantly predicted by political inclusion. Secondly, it requires that
violent dissent be a predictor of state repression. Whether inclusion ought to also has
a direct effect on repression is unclear. I suspect that it would probably tap the same
cross-national variation that veto players did. Thus, there will likely be an effect,
but it will be difficult to attribute the effect to inclusion without a relatively clear
theoretical direct link between inclusion and repression. If the mechanism proposed
here seems to work, then there are some clear institutional changes that could be
made to foster inclusion in the political system. Namely, things like proportional
representation could increase the number of viable political parties and, thus decrease
the demand for repression.
6.1 Measurement
To test the extent to which these mechanisms are operative, I need to estimate
two new measurement models - one representing the inclusive nature of the electoral
system and one representing the nature of violent dissent within the polity. These
models will generally be estimated in a fashion similar to those above.
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6.1.1 Measuring Inclusiveness
Indicators for inclusiveness must be ones that change as a function of the diver-
sity in opinions represented in the political system. To this end, I include a set of
both behavioral and institutional variables. First, I use a number of measures from
Golder’s (2005) database. The database houses an extraordinary amount of informa-
tion pertaining to nuances of the institutional design in democracies. While many
of these are outside the realm of interest for my particular purposes, there are a few
that are worth exploring. First, I use two measures of the party system - number of
electoral parties and number of parliamentary parties. These are basically Herfindahl
indices (or rather inverses thereof) that increase as the dispersion of either votes in
the former or legislative seats in the latter approaches equality across the parties re-
ceiving votes or seats. The particular calculations are done according to Laasko and
Taagepara (1979). From this dataset, I also use the electoral system type which can
take values – majoritarian, proportional, multi-tier, and mixed. The expectation here
is that proportional systems are more inclusive than majoritarian and other mixed
types. Finally, I also use the average district magnitude as increases here should also
foster multi-party competition.1
I also pull two variables from other datasets. First I use competition from Van-
hanen’s (2000) dataset, which simply provides the percentage of legislative seats held
by all but the largest party. This should provide similar, though still slightly dif-
ferent information to the effective number of party indices above. Finally, I use the
variance on the main left-right dimension within each country-election cycle from the
Comparative Manifestos Project Budge and Bara (2001), Klingemann et al. (2007).
This should provide information not on the number of parties, but on the relative
1There are majoritarian systems with average district magnitudes greater than one, namely
Japan, Mali, Mongolia and Thailand. However, the vast minority of majoritarian systems have
single-member districts.
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dispersion of political parties across the ideological space. Systems that have a wider
spread of parties should be more likely to have parties that accommodate a wide
range of political views. If this is true, then people who might otherwise be driven to-
ward violent dissent could have vehicles to address their concerns within the political
system.
I estimate the same type of model as above - a Bayesian measurement model. One
interesting feature of these data are that they tend to basically be constant within
country-election cycle. This has implications for statistical models that I will address
later, but it also has implications for the measurement model. The measurement
model should be carried out on the data using country-election cycle as the unit of
observation. In the data at hand, this leaves roughly 203 observations covering 41
countries with an average of 5 elections in each country. Once computed, the posterior
means can be merged back in to either country-year or country-election cycle data as
required.
Five of these variables are essentially continuous - effective number of electoral
parties, effective number of parliamentary parties, the average district magnitude,
variance of the left-right dimension and the competition measure from Vanhanen.
Further, these are all constrained to positive values, but do not necessarily take integer
values. Thus, I use the natural logarithm of these variables in the measurement models
to put their values, at least theoretically, on the whole real number line. Electoral
system is an unordered categorical variable with four possible values. I estimate the
following equations in the measurement model:
Y Ci = λ1,j + λ2,jInclusioni + εij (6.1)





where Y Ci denotes the natural log of the j = 5 continuous variables mentioned above
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and Y Pi represents the polychotomous, unordered electoral system variable. Some
identifying restrictions must be placed on the model. Specifically, these are that
λ1,1 = 0, λ2,1 = 1 and that γ1,1 = γ2,1 = 0. The first two constraints work to identify
the scale of the latent variable and the last restriction identifies the reference category
in the multinomial logit model.
The priors in the model are also as above. The coefficient estimates, the λ1,j, γ1,j
and γ2,j were all given unconstrained normal priors with zero mean and variance of
10. The λ2,j parameters were given similar normal priors that were constrained to
be positive. The residual variances for the continuous variables were given IG(1, 1)
priors. The model appeared to have converged rapidly2 and the results below are
from the last 1000 iterations of two chains after 10,000 burn-in iterations.
Table 6.1 shows the results of the measurement model. Some variables are rea-
sonably good indicators – namely, average district magnitude and the number of
political parties. The values in the PRE column show the proportional reductions in
error owing to the measurement model. Most of these are reasonable (in the 0.2-0.3
range). While these do not show especially strong inter-relationships between these
variables, there is certainly some common variation that the model is picking up.3
The one variable that really does not belong is the variance on the left-right dimen-
sion. Apparently there is little relationship between inclusion as measured by the
other variables, and the spread of political parties on the main dimension of political
competition. There is, however, a considerable amount of research criticizing the
Manifesto Research Group’s method for estimating placements on the main dimen-
2Both the visual diagnostics and the Brooks, Gelman and Rubin diagnostic suggested convergence
on all parameters.
3An eigen-decomposition of the correlation matrix of the five continuous variables has eigenvalues
of 2.88 and 0.99 for the first and second dimension suggesting only one underlying dimension to these
data.
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sion of competition (e.g., Bakker, Edwards and Netjes 2006, Laver, Benoit and Garry
2003) suggesting that while some result may exist on the “true,” dimension, it fails
to obtain on these estimates. Since the manifesto data are mostly noise with respect
to this model, I estimate it again removing this variable. These results are in the
right-most columns of Table 6.1. The results here are quite similar to those discussed
above.
6.1.2 Measuring Violent Dissent
The data on violent dissent is considerably worse than data on any other single
piece of the puzzle here. There are good country or regional datasets. For example,
Ron Francisco has data on some European democracies, but truncates both the spa-
tial and temporal dimensions of this study. The World Handbook of Political and
Social Indicators IV Jenkins and Taylor (2002) has an interesting set of events data
for a wide range of countries, but only for the years 1991-2000. In the interest of re-
taining as many observations as possible, I choose to use information from a couple of
different datasets. First, I use data from the Cross National Time-Series Data Archive
(Banks 2001) pertaining to the number of general strikes, riots and anti-government
demonstrations. These are counts of the identified activities ranging from zero (the
modal category for each) to generally somewhere in the low-teens. I recode these such
that six represents values greater than or equal to six.4
There has been a growing interest with respect to the effect of terrorist actions on
internal state politics and repression Enders and Sandler (e.g., 1993). I use a com-
bination of the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE)
data (Mickolus et al. 2003) and data from the Memorial Institute for the Prevention
of Terrorism (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 2006) to code ter-
rorist events. Specifically, countries are coded as to whether they had terrorist events
4I did this to avoid having the findings driven by a relatively small set of outliers.
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at all, whether they had terrorist events that generated injuries and whether they
had terrorist events that generated fatalities. To incorporate both sources of data,
I simply used the maximum value of events, injuries and fatalities across the two
datasets for each year. Since I am more concerned with the presence or absence of
events, rather than the aggregate counts of fatalities, injuries or events, this seemed
a reasonable strategy.
To calculate the posterior means of violent conflict, I used the following equations:











where Y Ci,j refers to the j = 3 count variables (riots, anti-government demonstrations
and general strikes) and Y Bi,j refers to the j = 3 binary terrorist events. Just as
above, λ1,1 = 0 and λ1,2 = 1 were imposed as identifying restrictions. The other
λ1,j parameters were given unconstrained normal distributions with zero mean and
variance of 10. The other λ2,j parameters were given normal priors with zero mean and
variance 10, but were constrained to be positive to prevent an equally good mirror
image solution from appearing. The model appeared to have converged relatively
quickly, with the results below resulting from the last 1,000 iterations from two chains
after 10,000 burn-in iterations.
The results of the measurement model are in Table 6.2. These results are relatively
encouraging. They are encouraging because they suggest that the violent activities,
such as riots and anti-government demonstrations are better predicted by this dimen-
sion than what might be seen as more legitimate, non-violent activity such as general
strikes. Further, the violent terrorist activities are also all well-described by the latent
variable with proportional reductions in error of around 50%. This provides strong
evidence that higher values on the violence variable will relate to situations where
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security is, indeed, in peril.
Figure 6.1 provides a sense of the variance of these data across countries and over
time. As you can see, there is considerably more within-country variation here than
on any of the other indicators. A simple variance-decomposition suggests that about
35% of the variance can be attributed to between-country variation and the remaining
65% is within-country variation.
6.2 Violent Dissent and Inclusiveness
Now, I can use the measures developed above to test theories about violent dissent
and political inclusiveness. The simplest one suggests that inclusiveness suppresses
violent dissent. To test this, I simply regress violent dissent on inclusiveness. The
structure of the data, however, requires a multilevel model as inclusiveness only varies
by country-election cycle. Thus, I estimate the following set of equations:
Repressionij = αi + εij (6.5)
αi = γ00 + γ01Inclusioni + νi (6.6)
where j indexes country-years within country-elections and i indexes country-election
cycle. This allows appropriate hypothesis testing of the inclusion variable given that
there are only i independent pieces of information and not N . The model provides
direct estimates of σν and σε as well as empirical Bayes estimates of the parameters
νj. The expectation here is that as inclusion increases, violent dissent should be
lower. Since violent dissent and inclusion are both unobserved, I apply the strategy
discussed in footnote 3 (page 59) to propagate the latent variable uncertainty through
the predictive model.
Table 6.3 shows the parameter estimates from the model. Here, inclusion is a
significant predictor of violent dissent in the manner expected by the hypothesis. This
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Note: The lines represent violent dissent in each country over time. In the inter-
est of presenting the information as clearly as possible, I have omitted measures of
uncertainty.
confirms the first part of the analysis suggested in the introduction to this chapter -
namely that violence must be a function of inclusion. Inclusion ranges from around
-0.7 to 2.5. Repression has a range of around 11, so moving inclusion across its range
will be accompanied by a change of around 8 or 9% of the range of repression. This
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is not a huge effect, but is it respectable.
It is also worth estimating a model that assumes a two-level structure with country
at the second level. Then it is possible to investigate whether there is any within
country relationship between violence and inclusion. Thus, I estimate the following
model:
Repressionij = αij + βInclusion
c
it + εij (6.7)
αi = γ00 + γ01Inclusioni + νi (6.8)
Here, Inclusioncit represents inclusion that has been demeaned at the country level.
The results in Table 6.4 show that the relationship is largely cross-country in nature.
The sign of the relationship remains the same, but it is not statistically significant
within-country. The relationship is still statistically significant between countries.
6.3 Violent Dissent and Repression
Now, for the second piece of the puzzle - is repression effected by violence. Since
the data here are arranged by country-year and, at least theoretically, both variables
can vary over country and year, then a multilevel model seems appropriate here,
too. I start by estimating a relatively simple model regression repression on violence.
Specifically, I estimate the following:
Repressionit = αi + βiViolenceit + εit (6.9)
αi = γ00 + γ01Violencei + νi,1 (6.10)
βi = γ10 + νi,2 (6.11)
Here, the random intercept is predicted by the average level of violence in each coun-
try. This is basically allowing different between-country and within-country relation-
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ships to reveal themselves. I also tested to see whether βi varied as a function of the
mean country-level violence, but there was no evidence in support of that specifica-
tion.
Table 6.5 presents the results of this model. The evidence is less convincing on this
front. While this might be surprising theoretically, the surprise fades quickly when
looking back at the veto player results. There, it was made clear that repression
was not all that variable over time within each country. The results here basically
show that it is between variation that is causing the relationship. That is to say, the
relationship between the mean of violence and the mean of repression is quite strong.
However, there is relatively little evidence of within-country relationship between
violent dissent and repression.
There is, then, some evidence in favor of the relationship suggested by the conflict
hypothesis. Specifically, countries with more inclusion do, on average, have less violent
dissent. Further, countries with higher levels of violent dissent do, on average, have
more repression. Now, it will be interesting to see whether the effect of inclusion is
truly through violent dissent, or whether it also works more in a cross-country fashion.
To do this, I estimate the parameters of the following model:
Repressionit = αi + β1,iViolenceit + εit (6.12)
αi = γ00 + γ01Violencei + γ02Inclusioni + νi,1 (6.13)
(6.14)
This will show the extent to which the mean repression in each country is a function of
the mean violence and mean inclusion and the within-country effect of violence. The
results in Table 6.6 show that including both variables makes both statistically in-
significant. This shows that whatever relationship exists between the means of these
variables and country-level repression is fragile. Further, the within-country rela-
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tionship between violence and repression remains both statistically and substantively
weak. With the addition of political inclusion, both violence and political inclusion
coefficients become insignificant. This provides at least some evidence to the con-
tention that political inclusion’s effect (on top of being largely between-country) is
through violence, rather than direct.
Finally, I can put these results back in the context of the bigger model as was done
with voice. Again, I estimate a multilevel model with country-year as the level-one
unit of analysis and country as the level-two unit of analysis. Specifically, I estimate
the following model:
Repressionit = αi + β1,iGDP/capitait + β2,ilog(Population)it + εit (6.15)
αi = γ0,0 + γ0,1Violencei + γ0,2Entry > 1980i + νi,0 (6.16)
β1,i = γ1,0 + γ1,1Entry > 1980i + νi,1 (6.17)
β2,i = γ2,0 + νi,2 (6.18)
Here again, the second level effects are somewhat complicated. In general, they retain
the structure of above, with one change. Instead of the country-mean of salience in
the second level, I include the country-mean of violence. Aside from the exclusion of
salience at the individual-level, the rest of the model is the same as in equation 4.10.
Table 6.7 shows the results from this regression. Unlike the ones undertaken with
voice, many of the results seem to not hold in the new models. The main result of
interest is the coefficient on violence. It remains positive, though it is not statistically
significant when included with all of the other variables. Even the country-level
result is essentially gone here. The only significant factor here is the entry variable
which significantly increases the intercept. Substantively, it suggests that the new
democracies are considerably more repressive than older ones. This result remains
significant, just as it was before.
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This chapter shows that there is certainly a relationship between the mean levels
of inclusion and the mean level of violence, but it does not suggest that the relation-
ship goes much further than that. Again, even with violence, a variable that really
varies over country, and in a way that would be expected to influence repression, the
relationships remain generally cross-country in nature. When the variable is included
in a multilevel model which respects the structure of the data, the main finding of this
chapter essentially disappears, though the coefficient remains in the right direction.
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Table 6.1: Results of Inclusion Measurement Model
Variable Coefficient PRE Coefficient PRE
Effective Number of 1.000 0.20 1.000 0.17
Electoral Parties NA NA
Effective Number of 0.263 0.33 0.257 0.29
Political Parties (0.189, 0.34) (0.185, 0.332)
Average District Magnitude 1.712 0.95 1.676 0.96
(1.474, 1.975) (1.451, 1.924)
Variance of Left-Right (CMP) 0.112 0.01
(0.005, 0.282)
Competition (Vanhanen) 0.085 0.24 0.085 0.23
(0.053, 0.121) (0.052, 0.117)
Electoral System: 0.24 0.25
Proportional vs. Majority 9.198 8.914
(6.13, 12.98) (6.357, 11.67)
Multi-tier vs. Majority 1.364 1.572
(-1.142, 3.766) (-0.723, 4.168)
Multiple vs. Majority 0.350 0.711
(-5.225, 5.642) (-4.045, 5.682)
Note: Main entries are coefficients from the models in equations 6.1 and 6.2. The
entries in parentheses are the 95% credible intervals from the Bayesian model. En-
tries in the PRE column are proportional reductions in error. For the continuous
variables this is simply the squared correlation between the observed variable and the
measurement model predictions; for electoral system this is the proportional reduction





Table 6.2: Results of Violence Measurement Model
Variable Coefficient PRE
Anti-Government Demonstrations 1.000 0.69
NA




Terrorist Fatalities 0.575 0.51
(0.449, 0.709)
Terrorist Injuries 0.8262 0.56
(0.653, 1.011)
Terrorist Events 0.8285 0.31
(0.659, 1.019)
Note: Main entries are coefficients from the latent variable model described by equa-
tions 6.3 and 6.4. Entries in parentheses are 95% credible intervals. Entries in
the PRE column are R2 for the count variables and for the binary variables this is










σν : 95% CI (0.416, 0.657)
σ̄ε 1.065
σε: 95% CI (0.982, 1.154)
Note: Main entries are multilevel model coefficients using the strategy described in
footnote 3 (page 59). Entries in parentheses are standard errors. σ̄ν and σ̄ε were
obtained by taking the empirical mean of the parameters across m = 100 models.
The 95% CI’s for those parameters were obtained by computing the 2.5th and 97.5th
percentiles of the parameters across the 100 models.
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σν : 95% CI (0.394, 0.577)
σ̄ε 1.094
σε: 95% CI (1.013, 1.171)
Note: Main entries are multilevel model coefficients using the strategy described in
footnote 3 (page 59). Entries in parentheses are standard errors. σ̄ν and σ̄ε were
obtained by taking the empirical mean of the parameters across m = 100 models.
The 95% CI’s for those parameters were obtained by computing the 2.5th and 97.5th
percentiles of the parameters across the 100 models.
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σν1: 95% CI (1.406, 1.700)
σ̄ν2 0.055
σν2: 95% CI (0.006, 0.132)
σ̄ε 0.564
σε: 95% CI (0.511, 0.625)
Note: Main entries are multilevel model coefficients using the strategy described in
footnote 3 (page 59). Entries in parentheses are standard errors. σ̄ν1, σ̄ν2, and σ̄ε
were obtained by taking the empirical mean of the parameters across m = 100 models.
The 95% CI’s for those parameters were obtained by computing the 2.5th and 97.5th
percentiles of the parameters across the 100 models.
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σν1: 95% CI (0.512, 0.628)
σ̄ε 1.477
σε: 95% CI (1.378, 1.618)
Note: Main entries are multilevel model coefficients using the strategy described in
footnote 3 (page 59). Entries in parentheses are standard errors. σ̄ν1 and σ̄ε were
obtained by taking the empirical mean of the parameters across m = 100 models.
The 95% CI’s for those parameters were obtained by computing the 2.5th and 97.5th
percentiles of the parameters across the 100 models.
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Entry > 1980 3.446
(0.939)
GDP/capita (by 1000) 0.044
(0.048)





σν0: 95% CI (5.562, 21.762)
σ̄ν1 0.164
σν1: 95% CI (0.118, 0.210)
σ̄ν2 1.356
σν2: 95% CI (0.412, 2.657)
σ̄ε 0.399
σε: 95% CI (0.353, 0.451)
Note: Main entries are multilevel model coefficients using the strategy described in footnote 3 (page
59). Entries in parentheses are standard errors. σ̄ν0, σ̄ν1, σ̄ν2, and σ̄ε were obtained by taking the
empirical mean of the parameters across m = 100 models. The 95% CI’s for those parameters were
obtained by computing the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the parameters across the 100 models.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion: Putting it Together
Now, it is time to consolidate the findings from above. In each of the three
main chapters, I focus on one particular relationship - voice, veto and conflict. I
demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the effects of each of these variables,
to the extent that any exists at all, is in the form of between-country relationships
rather than within-country relationships. The potential exception is with salience,
though the multilevel regressions suggested that the within-country result was largely
an artifact of between-country variation.
It is at this point that one has to think carefully about how these interdependent
pieces - violence, voice and veto ought to fit together. Davenport (2007b) suggests
that the effects of voice and veto should be conditional on violence. Though he notes
that the variables representing voice and veto have variable effects in the presence and
absence of 1) other democracy variables and 2) conflict, the general trend is that the
pacifying effects of democracy decrease in the presence of large-scale conflict. This is
consistent theoretically with the findings of Davis (2007), Davis and Silver (2004).
This suggests a statistical model where both the country and individual effects of
salience and violence are in the model and only the individual effect of demeaned veto
is in the model. However, after some preliminary estimation, only the country-level
effects of violence and salience weather the tests of statistical significance. Further,
there were problems estimating a random slope on veto that was a function of violence.
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These models tended not to converge and I take this as a sign that this model, though
theoretically interesting is not statistically interesting. I further allowed an interaction
between violence and salience, but this, too, showed little in the way of statistical
evidence justifying its inclusion. After the winnowing down, I estimate the following
model:
Repressionit = αi + β1,iGDP/capitait + β2,ilog(Population)it + εit (7.1)
αi = γ0,0 + γ0,1Violencei + γ0,2Saliencei + γ0,3Entry > 1980i + νi,0 (7.2)
β1,i = γ1,0 + γ1,1Entry > 1980i + νi,1 (7.3)
β2,i = γ2,0 + νi,2 (7.4)
The results of this model are in Table 7.1. These confirm some major hypothe-
ses and disconfirm others. Briefly, these results relate in the following way to the
literature:
• These results confirm the idea that voice (electoral accountability) matters,
however they suggest that citizens may be as often “voting the bastards in,” as
they are “voting the bastards out.”
• Violence matters - in fact, violence has an enormous and significant effect on
repression. However, it does not, as the literature suggests, condition the effects
of voice.
• Violence is, itself, predicted by political inclusion, which suggests that political
inclusion has an indirect effect on repression through its pacifying effect on
political dissent. The investigation showed no evidence of a direct effect of
political inclusion on repression.
• Veto has no real impact on repression – especially when analyzed as suggested
by Tsebelis (2002).
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• All of the effects of democracy are between-country effects. None of these had
significant within-country effects.
I say something about each of these results in turn.
Davenport (2007b) found voice to be the most consistent democratic pacifier.
These results confirm that conclusion, though in quite a different way than intended.
The literature to date has generally implied that citizen preferences for repression will
be lower than state preferences for repression. As such, electoral accountability will
force leaders to choose less repression than they would left to their own devices. The
results here suggest that repression rises and falls with popular support for the same.
Leaders, rather than always existing on the boundary of acceptable behavior, follow
the citizens’ demands for repression. Those demands were shown to be a function of
the security environment, so security has an indirect effect through salience.
Violence does, indeed have a significant effect on repression, both substantively
and statistically. There are two particularly interesting things about this effect. First,
the significant effect comes between countries rather than within them. This suggests
that countries that are more violent on average have more repression on average.
There is no evidence of within country variation. That is to say, it is generally not
the case that changes in violent behavior generate changes in repression. Well, this
statement may be a bit disingenuous. The fact is that repression, as measured by the
CIRI variables (though there is no reason to believe that things would be significantly
different using different aggregate data) is simply not sensitive enough to pick up over-
time variation. In fact, of the 44 countries used across this analysis, there were only a
handful that saw statistically significant over-time changes in their repression scores.
So, rather than being completely busted, the jury remains out on this proposition.
The second important finding with respect to violence is that it does not condition
the effects of the other democracy variable(s). Across this investigation, there was no
evidence that democracy factors worked more or less in situations of threat. This is
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Entry > 1980 3.403
(0.765)
GDP/capita (by 1000) 0.093
(0.033)





σν0: 95% CI (0.000, 10.478)
σ̄ν1 0.136
σν1: 95% CI (0.096, 0.184)
σ̄ν2 0.496
σν2: 95% CI (0.196, 1.128)
σ̄ε 0.368
σε: 95% CI (0.333, 0.404)
Note: Main entries are multilevel model coefficients using the strategy described in footnote 3 (page
59). Entries in parentheses are standard errors. σ̄ν0, σ̄ν1, σ̄ν2, and σ̄ε were obtained by taking the
empirical mean of the parameters across m = 100 models. The 95% CI’s for those parameters were
obtained by computing the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the parameters across the 100 models.
likely for different reasons for the different democracy variables. First, for veto, the
lack of variation could be the culprit here. For salience, it could be because this is a
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behavioral measure. This is in contrast to suffrage or competition or something like
that. These measures do not change much over time. Thus, the effectiveness of these
measures needs to be “activated,” by some external event, like violence. Salience
tracks how activated the constituency is on the matter of repression, so to the extent
that salience is a reflection of the security environment, there is no need to condition
on the security environment again.
Violence is predicted by political inclusion. This proposition is one of the older
ones in the empirical literature, relating back at least to Henderson (1991). Again,
however, the effect of inclusion seemed to be across countries rather than within.
Countries with inclusive policies see, on average, less violent dissent. This lower-
than-average violent dissent translates directly into lower-than-average repression as
suggested by the previous point. The lack of within-country relationships here is not
surprising.
I argued above that veto player analysis as it is generally undertaken in this
literature has been done inappropriately. Tsebelis (2002) suggests that only within-
country comparisons can be made and that one country with three veto players should
not necessarily have less policy stability than a country with 4. Or, that the policy
stability may not be owing to the configuration of veto players. Thus, the investigation
undertaken above showed that both with respect to the number and position of veto
players that no interesting relationships emerged. As it turns out, in the final model
even the cross-country variation in veto players came up insignificant. Here, I think
the lack of cross-country variation is not a function of imprecise data, rather it is
a function of the glacially slow changes in institutional structures in consolidated
democracies. Thus, to profitably analyze the veto-player environment, we will need
a much longer time-series with greater within-country variation.
I have shown through rigorous measurement and appropriate analysis that many
of the things we thought we knew about the democracy-repression nexus were not
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borne out by the data. Further, the logic behind some of the relationships is actually
counter to the conventional wisdom. This work will provide a basis for further work
with more sensitive data to test more nuanced theories about democratic pacification.
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